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ABSTRACT 
Our research questions the assumption of human rationality underlying the 
Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) working theory that systemic incentives 
motivate defense acquisition participants to deviate from sound acquisition practices 
(incentives narrative) and explores whether systematic and predictable mental errors 
(cognitive biases) may also have a significant causal influence. We assessed the 
conclusiveness of GAO’s incentives narrative and examined whether it is likely that 
cognitive biases significantly contribute to deviations from sound acquisition practices. 
First, we compiled a decision bias dictionary (DBD) of cognitive and motivational biases. 
Then, we evaluated a selection of case studies and used the DBD to assign one or more 
bias codes for passages indicating deviations from sound acquisition practices or 
situations/decisions that were likely susceptible to one or more decision biases. Our 
analysis identified 347 discrete instances in which a decision bias was evident, including 
a significant number of both cognitive and motivational biases. We also found that 
although GAO’s incentives narrative was not represented as the singular correct view 
when it was initially proposed over 25 years ago, it h a s  remained largely 
unchanged and unquestioned. Therefore, to improve the implementation of sound 
acquisition practices and ultimately improve acquisition outcomes, acquisition reform 
efforts must research and address both categories of decision biases. 
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We all know what needs to be done. The question is why aren’t we doing 
it? 
—David Packard 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2015d, p. 4) 
 
The least questioned assumptions are often the most questionable. 
—Paul Broca (Schiller, 1992) 
 
We have gaping blind spots far bigger than our intuition would suggest. 
—Kyle Eschen, (Eschen, 2016) 
 
Are you a rational decision maker? We all would like to believe we are. However, 
significant advancements in decision science theory since the 1955, including the works of 
three Nobel Laureates, have been described as a slow steady retreat from the assumption of 
rationality in human decision making. In fact, there is now a vast, expanding, and robust 
body of knowledge and experimental evidence that points to the prevalence of systematic 
mental errors (a.k.a. cognitive biases) in decision making. Intelligent and reasonable test 
subjects, even experts in their own field of expertise, are susceptible to cognitive biases. In 
his Nobel Prize lecture, Kahneman recalled his earliest findings in the field of decision 
research: “Remarkably, the intuitive judgments of these experts did not conform to statistical 
principles with which they were thoroughly familiar” (2002, p. 450; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1971). The systematic discrepancies between how people actually behave (descriptive 
models) versus how they theoretically should behave (prescriptive models [a.k.a. normative 
models]) have given rise to the relatively new and disruptive study of behavioral economics.  
In a thorough review of Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition reform efforts 
from 1960–2009, Fox (2009) found that all of the 27 major defense acquisition studies during 
this time period “arrived at most of the same findings and made similar recommendations 
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[for reform]” (p. xi). In his report’s conclusion, Fox (2009) referenced and echoed the 
findings of an influential 1992 GAO report, stating “it is clear that the incentives inherent in 
the acquisition culture offer an explanation as to why weapon acquisition problems persist 
despite numerous attempts at reform” (p. 191; GAO, 1992). This conclusion encapsulates 
what we refer to as GAO’s incentives narrative, and it has become a foundational assumption 
underlying GAO’s recommendations for acquisition reform. Fundamentally, our research 
questions the validity of entrenched assumptions of human rationality underlying GAO’s 
incentives narrative; and offers an alternative narrative that reconciles these assumptions with 
recent developments in decision science theory. We contend that deviations from sound 
acquisition practices are likely the result of a combination of incentive-driven and cognitive-
driven decision biases. Even if DOD acquisition reform efforts were finally able to eliminate 
all of the systemic and intractable incentives identified by GAO, we argue this would not 
eliminate or mitigate the likely influence of cognitive-driven decision biases. Therefore, 
acquisition reform efforts must address both categories of decision biases to improve 
acquisition outcomes. 
This chapter provides necessary context regarding the focus of this research. First, a 
common terminology is established to ensure a consistent application among the varying 
fields of study incorporated into this research. Next, we provide necessary background 
beginning with a summary GAO’s findings concerning DOD weapon systems acquisition, a 
description of what we refer to as GAO’s incentives narrative, and overview GAO’s 
recommended knowledge-based acquisition (KBA) approach. We conclude the background 
section with a discussion of how the assumption of rationality of human decision making is 
a pivotal theme within our research. Next, the problem is defined in broad terms, followed 
by more detailed research objectives and specific research questions. Then, the purpose and 
methodology of our research is detailed; followed by a discussion of the assumptions, scope, 
and limitations relating to this research project. Finally, a thesis statement provides a 
summary of the problem, and takes a position regarding the conclusions to be drawn from 
this research.  
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A. TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology used within our research aligns most with behavioral decision 
research, to include the relatively new field of behavioral economics. However, because 
classical/behavioral psychology, classical/behavioral economics, organizational behavior, 
sociology, etc., study many of the same human behaviors using differing terminologies and 
definitions, we specify the meaning of several terms used in this paper.  
1. Biases 
In 2011, Kahneman states “systematic errors are known as biases, and they recur 
predictably in particular circumstances” (p. 3). 
2. Heuristics 
A heuristic is a simple mental process that “helps find adequate, though often 
imperfect, answers to difficult questions” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 98). According to Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974), we all rely on heuristics every day to “reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (p. 1124). A 
heuristic is not inherently good or bad, and while they are mostly characterized as automatic 
and intuitive, their use can also be deliberate. (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) Simply, 
heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb we all use continuously to make decisions 
and/or register impressions quickly, economically, and under uncertainty. Admittedly, this 
is an oversimplification of heuristics, and a more nuanced and technical description of 
heuristics is discussed in greater detail in our literature review. Finally, Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002) stated that while they developed the theory of heuristics while studying 
judgement under uncertainty, “the restriction to particular heuristics and to a specific context 
is largely arbitrary” (p. 4). For instance, they explained how heuristics are used when 
subconsciously perceiving visual information such as size, dimension, and distance. 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2002, 
2003) For the purposes of this paper, the term “heuristics” is used to reference judgmental 
heuristics, and the terms “cognitive bias,” “cognitive-driven bias,” and “cognitive decision 
bias” may be used interchangeably to include heuristic-driven biases. 
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3. Cognitive Biases  
Montibeller and von Winterfeldt (2015) define a cognitive bias as a “systematic 
discrepancy between the ‘correct’ answer in a judgmental task, given by a formal normative 
rule, and the decisionmaker’s or expert’s actual answer to such a task” (p. 1231). Cognitive 
biases are consistent and predictable “mental errors caused by our simplified information 
processing strategies” (Heuer, 1999, p. 111). Cognitive biases are typically distinguished 
from cultural, organizational, and motivational biases (Heuer, 1999). In addition, Arnott 
(2006) states that “factors that influence decisions arising from psychological pathology, 
religious belief or social pressure (including customs, tradition and hero worship)” (p. 59, 
62), are “normally excluded from consideration in cognitive bias research” (p. 59). Biases 
related to judgement have been called cognitive biases, decision biases, or judgmental biases. 
Finally, some widely accepted cognitive biases—overconfidence bias being the foremost—
may or may not be the result of a combination of mental errors and motivational factors. 
Therefore, although these biases are widely categorized as cognitive biases, our research 
highlights these unique biases in our research. Unless otherwise specified, in the context of 
our studies, a cognitive bias is a mental error, and the terms “cognitive bias,” “cognitive-
driven bias,” and “cognitive decision bias” may be used interchangeably to encompass these 
types of biases.  
The body of knowledge relating to cognitive biases is vast and expanding, supported 
by scientifically robust and repeatable experimental evidence, and is widely considered to be 
generalizable to a broad range of fields of study (Heuer, 1999; see also Arnott, 1998, p. 3). 
Korteling et al. (2018) describes cognitive biases as “systematic, persistent, and consistent 
over different people and conditions” (p. 2). Although knowledge of cognitive biases cannot 
predict how any single individual will think or act in a particular situation, one can predict 
that a cognitive bias “will exist to a greater or lesser degree in most judgments made by most 
of the group” (Heuer, 1999, p. 113; see also Arnott, 1998, p. 3). Even experts are not immune 
from cognitive biases for which they are uniquely suited to resist. Heuer highlights that most 
“test subjects were experts in their field. They were physicians, stock market analysts, 
horserace handicappers, chess masters, research directors, and professional psychologists” 
(1999, p. 113; see also Kahneman, 2011; Davis, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
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4. Motivational Biases  
Montibeller and von Winterfeldt (2015) define motivational biases as “those in which 
judgments are influenced by the desirability or undesirability of events, consequences, 
outcomes, or choices” (p. 1231), further clarifying these can be conscious or subconscious. 
Motivational biases are also known as “incentive-driven biases” and “interest biases.” Using 
the term “interest biases,” Lovallo and Sibony define motivational biases as biases that “arise 
in the presence of conflicting incentives, including nonmonetary and even purely emotional 
ones” (p. 15). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe these biases as “motivational effects 
such as wishful thinking or the distortion of judgments by payoffs and penalties” (p. 1131). 
Unlike cognitive biases, motivational biases “result from one’s own self-interest [and] any 
emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment” (Heuer, 1999, p. 111). 
For the purposes of this paper, the terms “motivational bias,” “incentive-driven bias,” and 
“motivational decision bias” may be used interchangeably to encompass these types of 
biases. 
5. Logical Fallacies  
Fallacies are “common errors in reasoning that will undermine the logic of your 
argument. … [and] can be either illegitimate arguments or irrelevant points, and are often 
identified because they lack evidence that supports their claim” (Purdue Writing Lab, n.d.). 
Lt Col. Parry (2013) aptly describes the difference between logical fallacies and biases 
stating “Biases tilt our thinking in one direction or another. Fallacious logic doesn’t just tilt 
one’s thinking—it completely undermines it” (p. 49). While, logical fallacies are distinct 
from cognitive biases, many taxonomies of cognitive biases do not make this distinction, 
often including logical fallacies under general groupings of cognitive biases. Nonetheless, 
this distinction was not a substantive or practical issue for our research. The following are 
instances where we use the term “cognitive bias” instead of “fallacy” in order to maintain 
consistency with our primary source taxonomy of cognitive biases (Arnott, 1998, 2006). 
Arnott (1998) lists the terms “gamblers fallacy” and “conjunction fallacy” as cognates (i.e., 
similar terms) for what he describes as the “Chance” and “Subset” cognitive biases, 
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respectively. Lastly, Kahneman (2011) uses a similar term “planning fallacy” to describe 
what Arnott defines as the “Overconfidence” cognitive bias. 
6. Decision Biases 
Due to the multitude of terms used in this study, we have used the term “decision 
bias” to indicate a bias (cognitive, motivational, or some combination of the two), fallacy, or 
group/organizational dynamic which create predictable errors in judgement. Such an 
overarching term is necessary because not all biases can be neatly separated into discrete 
categories and are likely to overlap (Arnott, 2006, p. 59). 
7. Incentives 
For clarity and brevity, we must establish what is meant when discussing incentives, 
in the context of GAO’s incentives narrative, because GAO’s descriptions of incentives can 
be confusing, ambiguous, and/or inconsistent. Therefore, regardless of how the effect is 
achieved (i.e., negative reinforcement, positive reinforcement, punishment, etc.), we refer to 
incentives that promote unbiased knowledge-based and/or data-driven decisions as “positive 
incentives.” Conversely, we refer to incentives that promote decisions based on individual 
or programmatic self-interest as “negative incentives.” For instance, GAO (1992) states 
“decisions that restrict or control programs operate under weak incentives” (p. 38). We would 
simplistically interpret this statement to mean that decisions to restrict or control programs 
have weak positive incentives. In another example, GAO (1992) states “Such decisions [to 
improve a program’s cost realism] face strong disincentives because they conflict with the 
other, more powerful, needs served by the programs” (p. 39). We would simplistically 
interpret this statement to mean that the decisions to improve a program’s cost realism have 
strong negative incentives. When GAO uses the term “incentives” ambiguously or 
inconsistently, we either summarize their statements or directly quote GAO to include 
enough context and/or notes to indicate whether positive and/or negative incentives are 
indicated.  
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8. Rationality  
The term “rational” is generally understood in common speech to indicate that 
someone is reasonable, but we specifically define this term here because “rationality” has a 
specific meaning in the context of our research. According to Kahneman (2011):  
For economists and decision theorists, the adjective has an altogether 
different meaning. The only test of rationality is not whether a person’s 
beliefs and preferences are reasonable, but whether they are internally 
consistent. … Rationality is logical coherence—reasonable or not. (p. 411) 
Throughout much of decision science research and within this paper, we use the word 
“irrational” to indicate a deviation for logical coherence, not a deviation from reason. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. GAO’s Findings Concerning Department of Defense Weapon Systems 
Acquisition 
In their 2019 High-Risk Report, GAO (2019) once again identified DOD weapon 
systems acquisition as a high risk area. In fact, the report noted that DOD weapon systems 
acquisition has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 1990. Echoing their previous reports, 
they found that despite a long history of acquisition reforms, “many DOD programs continue 
to fall short of cost, schedule, and performance goals. Consequently, DOD often pays more 
than anticipated, buys less than expected, and, in some cases, delivers fewer capabilities to 
the warfighter” (GAO, 2019, p. 143). These persistent problems pose a significant risk to the 
United States. The timely delivery of affordable, high-quality products and weapon systems 
is essential to equipping our nation’s warfighters; and is essential for the DOD to maintain 
technical superiority and overmatch over our adversaries, respond to rapidly evolving threats, 
and better protect and enable the warfighter (GAO, 2015d, pp. 1–2). In a familiar refrain 
from their prior reports, GAO (2017c) recommended Congress address a defense acquisition 
culture afflicted by “a prevailing set of incentives that encourages decisions to go forward 
with programs before they are ready, and a willingness to accept cost growth and schedule 
delays as the likely byproduct of such decisions” (GAO, 2017c, p. 273). GAO’s assessment 
of defense acquisition, and their recommendations for congressional action are largely 
shaped by longstanding fundamental assumptions regarding the causal relationship between 
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incentives and deviations from sound acquisition practices, which according to GAO, 
ultimately lead to poor acquisition outcomes. In other words, GAO believes poor acquisition 
outcomes are partially the result of various incentives that favor optimistic perspectives that 
compromise good judgment when making decisions. For brevity, we refer to this causal 
relationship as the “incentives narrative.” This paper seeks neither to confirm nor refute this 
narrative, but examines the narrative’s fundamental assumptions and implications, and 
explores the possibility that cognitive biases may also have a causal influence that results in 
deviations from sound acquisition practices. 
2. GAO’s Incentives Narrative 
This section provides an overview of GAO’s conclusions regarding the connection 
between defense acquisition culture and incentives, and poor acquisition outcomes. GAO has 
reported on DOD acquisition programs since 1970 (GAO, 2009). The influence of GAO’s 
findings and recommendations to Congress regarding proposed acquisition reform efforts for 
almost 50 years cannot be overstated. This section describes GAO’s findings that the 
incentives narrative is the predominant underlying force which effectively undermines 
decades of acquisition reforms and established best practices.  
GAO (1992) suggests that poor acquisition outcomes are the logical consequences of 
an acquisition culture, conflicted by various incentives, which constrains the implementation 
of sound acquisition practices. GAO has repeatedly found that already established best 
practices and policies are not being fully implemented. (GAO, 1992, p. 51; 2013, p. 1; 2014, 
pp. 6–8; 2015d, pp. 3–7; and GAO, 2019, p. 144) GAO (1992) defined “culture” in the 
context of the incentives narrative as the “collective patterns of behavior exhibited by the 
numerous participants in the acquisition process and the incentives for that behavior” (p. 2). 
According to GAO, this culture causes participants from the top-down to make suboptimal 
or even poor decisions. GAO (2015c) states “this culture is held in place by a set of incentives 
that are more powerful than policies to follow best practices” (p. 2). Furthermore, GAO 
(1992) states that DOD weapon system acquisitions “have become integral to policy 
decisions, definitions of roles and functions, justifications of budget levels and shares, service 
reputations, influence of oversight organizations, defense spending in localities, the industrial 
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base, and to individual careers” (p. 38). While reporting on poor acquisition outcomes for 
the Ford Class Aircraft Carrier Program, GAO (2015c) elaborates how incentives encourage 
deviations from sound acquisition practices: 
Competition with other programs vying for funding puts pressure on program 
sponsors to project unprecedented levels of performance (often by counting 
on unproven technologies) while promising low cost and short schedules. 
These incentives … create a culture in weapon system acquisition that 
encourages undue optimism about program risks and costs. … To be sure, 
this is not to suggest that the acquisition process is foiled by bad actors. 
Rather, program sponsors and other participants act rationally within the 
system to achieve goals they believe in. Competitive pressures for funding 
simply favor optimism in setting cost, schedule, technical, and other 
estimates. (GAO, 2015c, p. 13) 
The report further elaborates: 
The experiences of the Ford-class program are not unique—rather, they 
represent a typical acquisition outcome. It is too simplistic to look at the 
program as a product of a broken acquisition process; rather it is indicative of 
a process that is in equilibrium. It has worked this way for decades with 
similar outcomes: weapon systems that are the best in the world, but cost 
significantly more, take longer, and perform less than advertised. The rules 
and policies are clear about what to do, but other incentives force 
compromises of good judgment. The persistence of undesirable outcomes 
such as cost growth and schedule delays suggests that these are consequences 
that participants in the process have been willing to accept. It is not broken in 
the sense that it is rational; that is, program sponsors must promise more for 
less in order to win funding approval. This naturally leads to an unexecutable 
business case. Once funded and approved, reality sets in and the program 
must then offer less for more. (GAO, 2015c, p. 15) 
In summary, GAO believes poor acquisition outcomes are partially the result of an 
acquisition culture that is compromised by various incentives that favor optimistic 
perspectives that hinder good judgment when making decisions.  
3. Knowledge-Based Acquisition (KBA) Approach  
In order to address persistent cost, schedule, and performance issues within DOD 
weapons acquisition programs, GAO has consistently recommended DOD implement a 
knowledge-based acquisition (KBA) approach when making acquisition decisions. GAO 
(2004) indicates that in order to address these issues “it is essential that sound foundations 
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for investments in systems be laid now so that the resulting programs can be executed within 
estimates of available resources” (p. 2). The report also found the KBA approach to be the 
key to commercial firms’ success developing “increasingly sophisticated products in less 
time and at lower cost” (GAO, 2004, p. 2). According to GAO (2005b), the KBA approach 
“enables developers to be reasonably certain, at critical junctures or ‘knowledge points’ in 
the acquisition life cycle, that their products are more likely to meet established cost, 
schedule, and performance baselines and, therefore provides them with information needed 
to make sound investment decisions” (GAO, 2005b, pp. 9–10). Fundamentally, a KBA 
approach seeks to base acquisition decisions upon knowledge and data. Because this 
methodology is widely considered to be a sound acquisition practice, we adopted the KBA 
approach as the primary normative standard for identifying deviations from sound 
acquisition practices in our analysis. 
GAO considers the successful implementation of the KBA approach to be 
significantly influenced by incentives. In their report on the KBA approach, GAO (2004) 
incorporates elements of GAO’s incentives narrative, stipulating that the successful 
implementation of the KBA approach was contingent upon DOD’s ability to “instill 
incentives that encourage realism and candor in the acquisition process and sustain its 
commitment to improving business practices” (GAO, 2004, p. 9). DOD has formally adopted 
the KBA approach within DOD Directive (DODD) 5000.01 and DODD 5000.02 (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
[OUSD{AT&L}], 2007, p. 7; OUSD(AT&L), 2003, pp. 2–3). Why, then, are DOD programs 
laden with cost, schedule and performance issues? Year after year, GAO has consistently 
found “DOD programs continue to not fully implement knowledge-based acquisition 
practices” (GAO, 2018a, p. 3; see also GAO, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2019). In their most 
recent annual weapons systems assessment GAO (2019) found that, 45 out of 51 current 
programs reviewed failed to follow KBA practices and “proceeded into system development, 
through critical design reviews, and into production without completing the key knowledge-
based practices … this lack of knowledge and the effects it can have throughout a program’s 
acquisition life cycle can increase the risk of undesirable cost and schedule outcomes” (p. 3). 
GAO and DOD have consistently used the incentives narrative to explain acquisition 
11 
decisions that deviate from sound acquisition practices such as the KBA approach (GAO, 
2017a). The constant refrain from GAO is that DOD needs to address incentives which 
encourage deviations from their recommended best practices. GAO (2017c) emphasizes this 
stating: “At this point, DOD needs to build on existing reforms—not necessarily revisiting 
the process itself but augmenting it by tackling incentives” (p. 272). If GAO’s assessment 
regarding incentives—which they have repeated for over 25 years (GAO, 1992)—is correct, 
it would seem the status quo will not be changing anytime soon. Figure 1 illustrates the DOD 
acquisition process and GAO-identified knowledge points. 
 
Figure 1. DOD Acquisition Process and GAO-Identified Knowledge Points. 
Source: GAO (2019, p. 8). 
4. The Decline of Assumed Rationality in Decision Making Theory 
In a comprehensive RAND study of modern decision science, Davis, Kulick, and 
Egner (2005) described advancements in decision making theory since 1955 as a “slow, 
steady retreat” (p. 77) from the assumption of rationality of human decision making. This 
pivot from assumed human rationality was significantly influenced by the expansive works 
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of three Nobel Laureates: Herbert Simon (awarded Nobel Prize in 1978), Daniel Kahneman 
(awarded Nobel Prize in 2002), and Richard Thaler (awarded Nobel Prize in 2017) (Nobel 
Media, n.d.). Amos Tversky, who died in 1996, would have received the Nobel Prize with 
Daniel Kahneman in 2002, and his contributions are widely held in the same high regard 
as Kahneman’s (Kahneman, 2002). We highlight the academic stature of these individuals 
to emphasize that their works are not fringe theories, and they merit serious consideration. 
The following is a summary of the major developments in decision science theory that 
pertain to the assumption of human rationality, which is at the center of this research. 
a. Rational-Choice Model 
Human rationality is a foundational assumption underlying “classic theories in 
economics, philosophy, linguistics, social science, and psychology” (Lieder, Griffiths, 
Huys, & Goodman, 2018, p. 1) (See Mill, 1882; Friedman & Savage, 1948; Von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1944; Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Fodor, 1975; Braine, 1978; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Lohmann, 2008; Hedstrom & Stern, 2008; Frank & Goodman, 
2012; Harman, 2013 [as cited in Lieder et al., 2018, p. 1]). Davis et al. (2005) describe this 
paradigm of thinking as the rational-choice model (RCM) (Davis et al., 2005, p. 77). 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) describe traditional economics (a.k.a. neoclassical 
economics) as being built upon the belief that humans behave as rational agents with 
“stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those 
preferences” (p. 1; see also Kahneman, 2002, p. 471; & 2011, p. 8). RCM does not 
differentiate between how humans should make decisions (prescriptive models [a.k.a. 
normative models]) and how humans actually make decisions (descriptive models), 
assuming away deviations from RCM as non-relevant outliers (Carter, Kaufmann, & 
Michel, 2007, p. 633; Rodman, 2015, p. 10). 
b. Bounded Rationality 
Simon’s (1955) groundbreaking theory of bounded rationality was the first 
significant challenge to the RCM’s widely accepted assumption of rationality in human 
decision making. (Davis et al., 2005, p. 77) Bounded rationality modified RCM, 
emphasizing the “constraints of time, resources, and cognitive capacity … [which] force 
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decisionmakers to construct a simplified mental model of the world” (Davis et al., 2005, p. 
77; see also Heuer, 1999, pp. 2–3; Kahneman, 2003, p. 1; Davis et al., 2005, pp. 8–9; & 
Rodman, 2015, p. 13).  
c. Heuristics and Biases Paradigm 
Building upon Simon’s theory of bounded rationality, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) published their seminal work on cognitive biases and heuristics. Their article is one 
of the most highly cited works in social science, and has been extensively applied in studies 
of psychology, economics, finance, medicine, legal judgement, intelligence analysis, 
military strategy, philosophy, and statistics (Kahneman, 2011, p. 8). Their work laid the 
foundation for Richard Thaler to establish the “then-heretical (and now well-established) 
view of [behavioral] economics, by using psychological observations to explain violations 
of standard economic theory” (Kahneman, email communication to Margaret Levi, 20 May 
2016; as cited by Gaetani, 2018). Like almost all research on the subject of cognitive biases, 
this paper heavily draws upon extensive works of Kahneman and Tversky, to include their 
widely adopted “heuristics and biases approach” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 
2002, p. 465). In our judgement, what makes their research influential in so many fields is 
their extraordinary ability to support their theories and conclusion with large bodies of 
compelling empirical research. Their cleverly devised experiments and questionnaire sets 
demonstrated repeatable systemic biases, which made their findings readily accessible and 
applicable to multiple areas of study. Davis et al. (2005) described this approach as the 
“heuristics and biases paradigm (HBP)” (p. 13). HBP rejects the assumption that RCM is 
an accurate descriptor of reality, but generally accepts the RCM’s prescriptive/normative 
models as a standard to assess whether a decision was objectively right or wrong (Davis et 
al., 2005, p. 78).  
d. Naturalistic Paradigm 
While the HBP has been widely adopted and built upon by decision science 
researchers, HBP has received critiques throughout the years, predominately emanating 
from the works of Gary Klein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Davis et al., 2005, p. 16; Gigerenzer, 
1991, 1996; Klein, 2008). According to Davis et al. (2005), criticisms of HBP can be 
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grouped together into a naturalistic paradigm (NP) school of thought (See also Korteling, 
Brouwer, & Toet, 2018). NP grudgingly accepts HBP’s general descriptions of heuristics 
and cognitive biases, but it critiques HBP’s lab-based research methodologies, use of 
normative models, the role of expert intuition, and HBP’s lack of practical utility as an 
underlying psychological process (Davis et al., 2005; & Rodman, 2015, pp. 18–19). 
Conversely, NP values field-based research methodologies, focuses on expert subjects 
“acting in the domain of their expertise” (Davis et al., 2005, p. 79), rejects normative 
standards of rationality, and idealizes “choices [made] quickly and intuitively” (p. 80). 
Essentially, NP embraces the utility of heuristics, and “celebrates biases as adaptive and 
situation-appropriate” (Davis et al., 2005, p. 17). However, according to Davis et al. (2005) 
and Kahneman and Tversky (1996), the major conflicts between NP and HBP are more 
theoretical and diminish upon closer examination. Based on our readings, it would seem 
that Kahneman has gone to great lengths to answer and address the NP’s criticisms, to the 
extent that we do not believe the two paradigms should necessarily be viewed as mutually 
exclusive (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Kahneman, 2002, 2003, 2011; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; & Kahneman, Rosenfield, Gandhi, & Blaser, 2016). However, as detailed 
in this chapter, an in-depth comparison/synthesis of HBP/NP is unnecessary considering 
the scope of this research. 
e. Summary 
Why does this matter? Korteling et al. (2018) states “the discovery of cognitive 
biases and the following doubt on human rationality shakes the foundations of economics, 
the social sciences and rational models of cognition” (p. 2) (Lieder, Griffiths, Huys, & 
Goodman, 2017; as cited in Korteling et al., 2018). GAO’s incentives narrative implicitly 
relies upon the RCM paradigm, assuming acquisition participants act logically and 
rationally to maximize utility in the face of incentives. Davis et al. (2005) warns that 
viewing human decisions through the RCM paradigm may allow for apt technical 
descriptions and prescriptive models, but this view would “miss many of the factors that 
confront real decisionmakers” (p. 6). The contrast between GAO’s assumptions regarding 
incentives and Kahneman’s findings related to heuristics and cognitive biases can be 
compared to the clash between neoclassical economics and behavioral economics. 
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Neoclassical economics assumes that people are generally rational and respond to 
incentives (Mankiw, 2007); and explains away deviations from rationality as anomalies or 
as the result of “emotions such as fear, affection, and hatred” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 8; see 
also Kahneman, Knetsch et al., 1991) Conversely, due to its reliance upon bounded 
rationality and HBP, the disruptive field of behavioral economics focuses on how people 
actually behave (descriptive models), rather than how they should behave (prescriptive 
models). Charlie Munger, Warren Buffet’s longtime business partner, bluntly commented 
on the divide between neoclassical and behavioral economics stating: 
How could economics not be behavioral? If it isn’t behavioral, what the hell 
is it? And I think it’s fairly clear that all reality has to respect all other 
reality. If you come to inconsistencies, they have to be resolved, and so if 
there’s anything valid in psychology, economics has to recognize it, and 
vice versa. So I think the people that are working on this fringe between 
economics and psychology are absolutely right to be there. (Munger, 1995) 
The utility of GAO’s incentives narrative for explaining and identifying solutions 
for deviations for sound acquisition practices is greatly reliant upon the narrative’s 
fundamental assumptions, namely the RCM paradigm. If this fundamental assumption is 
inconsistent with prevailing theories of decision making, then one would expect GAO’s 
incentives narrative to be fundamentally flawed to some extent.  
C. PROBLEM 
The foundational assumption of human rationality underlying GAO’s incentives 
narrative has come under widespread scrutiny over the past 65 years, which raises concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of acquisition reform efforts guided by these assumptions. The 
incentives narrative is a core assumption that GAO, Congress, and the defense acquisition 
community have relied upon to shape acquisition reform efforts. Many of GAO’s 
recommendations for addressing poor acquisition outcomes have focused on negative 
incentives which, according to the incentives narrative, result in motivational decision 
biases. Addressing the incentives highlighted by GAO has proven an intractable problem 
because these incentives are often engrained into the structure and culture of the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) (Fox, 2009, p. xiii). If cognitive decision biases are at least 
partly responsible for suboptimal decisions that lead to poor acquisition outcomes, then 
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current acquisition reform efforts would be ineffective to some extent. In their influential 
article that has been cited over 36,000 times in published literature, Tversky & Kahneman 
(1974) state: “This article has been concerned with cognitive biases that stem from the 
reliance on judgmental heuristics. These biases are not attributable to motivational effects 
such as wishful thinking or the distortion of judgments by payoffs and penalties 
[Incentives]” (p. 1131). Further emphasizing their point, they referenced how test subjects 
exhibited severe judgmental errors despite being encouraged to be accurate and having 
properly aligned incentives to reward correct answers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). So 
Kahneman—arguably the world’s foremost authority on cognitive biases and Nobel 
Laureate—has found cognitive biases to often be manifestations of heuristics rather than 
incentives, even finding that properly aligned incentives did not prevent cognitive errors in 
judgement. Therefore, it is reasonable to question whether decision biases other than 
motivational biases (i.e., cognitive biases) play some part in shaping acquisition decisions. 
If true, even if all of the systemic and intractable incentives identified by GAO were 
somehow eliminated, doing so would only address the influence of incentive-driven 
decision biases on acquisition decisions and outcomes. Figures 2 and 3 provide simplified 
representations of GAO’s incentives narrative and this paper’s thesis. 
 
Figure 2. Representation of GAO’s Incentives Narrative 
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Figure 3. Simplified Representation of Thesis 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to examine whether cognitive decision 
biases could also be partly responsible for encouraging deviations from sound acquisition 
practices. To achieve this objective, we examined a sample of acquisition case studies to 
identify text passages indicating deviations from sound acquisition practices and/or other 
well-established normative principles, or situations/decisions that were likely susceptible 
to decision biases. These passages were then reviewed for indicators of incentive-driven 
and/or cognitive-driven decision biases using a customized dictionary of common decision 
biases. The desired end-state for this objective is to highlight the need to further research 
and ultimately address the influence of various cognitive biases, which may be hindering 
the implementation of sound acquisition practices and contributing to poor acquisition 
outcomes. Because of this, we expected that our research would raise more questions and 
lines of further inquiry than provide definitive recommendations or conclusions. 
The secondary objective of this research is to explore the fundamental assumptions, 
historical development, and empirical research/critical reviews (if any) supporting GAO’s 
incentives narrative. The desired end-state for this objective is to come to a reasonable 
determination as to the conclusiveness of GAO’s incentives narrative, and to assess its 
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ability to explain the role of decision biases as they pertain to the implementation of sound 
acquisition practices. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(1) Primary Research Questions 
1. Is it likely that cognitive decision biases significantly contribute to 
deviations from sound acquisition practices? 
2. Is the GAO incentives narrative well-founded and conclusive? 
(2) Secondary Research Questions 
1. What are some well-established types of cognitive and motivational 
decision biases; including descriptions, unique attributes, and situational 
indicators? 
2. What are the fundamental assumptions, historical development, and 
empirical research/critical reviews supporting GAO’s incentives narrative? 
3. Which cognitive and motivational decision biases may have contributed to 
deviations from sound acquisition practices in the coded case studies? 
F. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
Fundamentally, our research challenges the validity of entrenched assumptions of 
human rationality underlying GAO’s incentives narrative; and seeks to reconcile these 
assumptions with recent developments in decision science theory, specifically HBP. These 
groundbreaking theories have fundamentally reshaped the fields of economics and 
psychology; have been broadly applied to numerous fields of study, to include medicine, 
law, finance, etc.; and have been extensively applied by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) for intelligence analysis (Heuer, 1999), and by the DOD for military strategy. 
(Kahneman, 2011; Hillemann, Nussbaumer, & Dietrich, 2015; and University of Foreign 
Military and Cultural Studies [UFMCS], 2016). Considering this, is it reasonable to believe 
defense acquisition participants are largely unaffected by the cognitive biases that plague 
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DOD military strategists and CIA intelligence analysts? Our research examines GAO’s 
assumptions and conclusions through the lens of the HBP perspective rather than RCM 
perspective. By using the HBP perspective, we provide an illustrative view of an alternative 
narrative to explain widespread deviations from sound acquisition practices. 
Let’s explore an analogy to further understand the significance and purpose of our 
research. We’ve all heard the phrase “Where there’s smoke there’s fire.” In terms of GAO’s 
incentives narrative, the smoke is deviations from sound acquisition practices, the fire is 
decision biases, and the fuel for the fire is incentives. Not all fires are extinguished in the 
same way due to their composition; so you hopefully would not attempt to extinguish an 
electrical fire, lithium battery fire, or a grease fire with the same methods or extinguisher 
that you would use for a fire composed of wood. Our research questions whether incentives 
are the only significant source (fuel) for decision biases that lead to deviations from sound 
acquisition practices. If cognitive biases are fueling a significant number of decision biases, 
then GAO’s longstanding and unwieldy solution to extinguish the problem, removing 
negative incentives and improving positive incentives, would have little effect on these 
biases. Returning to our analogy, there is some overlap among the methods that are 
effective in extinguishing different types of fires. For instance, you cannot extinguish a 
grease fire with water, but you can extinguish both a regular fire and a grease fire by 
starving the fire of oxygen. Similarly, you cannot eliminate the influence of purely 
cognitive biases by removing incentives, but you may be able to mitigate the impacts of 
both cognitive and motivational biases through various bias mitigation techniques and 
strategies.  
G. METHODOLOGY  
To answer the primary and secondary research questions, we performed our 
analysis in the following roughly sequential phases. First, a thorough literature review was 
conducted to inform our overall analysis, examine numerous decision bias taxonomies 
necessary to develop our decision bias dictionary (DBD), identify common types of 
decision biases, and review the literature relating to GAO’s incentives narrative. To ensure 
we had a sound theoretical understanding and consistent internal schema necessary to 
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conduct our analysis, we reviewed the expansive body of literature relating to cognitive 
biases, heuristics, motivational biases, and decision bias theory. Since there is not a widely 
accepted taxonomy or authoritative dictionary of decision and/or cognitive biases 
(Rodman, 2015, p. 18), we analyzed numerous decision bias taxonomies in order to 
determine which decision biases should be included in our DBD. After compiling our 
customized DBD, we assigned decision bias codes, established transcript coding 
methodologies, jointly reviewed each decision bias within our DBD, and selected case 
study transcripts to be coded. Subsequently, we coded our initial transcripts, validated/
updated our coding methodologies and dictionary, coded the remaining transcripts, and 
compiled/analyzed our findings. A detailed description of the analysis methodologies and 
data used to answer our primary and secondary research questions is included in Chapter 
III. 
In order to achieve our primary research objective, we needed to assess whether it 
is likely that cognitive decision biases significantly contribute to deviations from sound 
acquisition practices (primary research question 1a). To do this, we created a customized 
DBD of well-established cognitive and motivational decision biases (secondary research 
question 2a). Using our DBD, we reviewed a selection of case study transcripts to identify 
text passages indicating deviations from sound acquisition practices and/or situations/
decisions that were likely susceptible to decision biases. We reviewed these passages to 
assess whether it was likely the decision/situation was likely influenced by one or more 
decision biases. (secondary research question 2c). This process is detailed further in 
Chapter III. The intent of our analysis was to provide an illustrative view of the HBP 
perspective, indicating which (if any) decision biases were likely to have influenced 
deviations from sound acquisition practices. 
In order to achieve our secondary research objective, we needed to assess whether 
GAO’s incentives narrative was well-founded and conclusive (primary research question 
1b). To do this, we reviewed relevant GAO reports and major acquisition reform studies’ 
findings concerning defense acquisition culture and incentives to examine the fundamental 
assumptions, historical development, and empirical research/critical reviews supporting 
GAO’s incentives narrative (secondary research question 2b). To do this, we reviewed 
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approximately 60 years of relevant GAO reports and major acquisition reform studies’ 
findings concerning defense acquisition culture and incentives. 
H. SCOPE/LIMITATIONS 
1. Scope 
Our research does not seek to disprove the incentives narrative, nor does it seek to 
prove conclusively that cognitive biases significantly contribute to deviations from sound 
acquisition practices. Rather, our research seeks to provide an HBP-based alternative to 
GAO’s incentives narrative. We hope to encourage additional inquiries into the adequacy 
of the incentives narrative’s ability to explain why acquisition participants consistently 
deviate from sound acquisition practices. Since we’ve found little to no research applying 
HBP to the DAS, we seek to highlight the need to further research into the influence of 
various cognitive biases. If DOD determines that cognitive biases significantly contribute 
to poor acquisition outcomes, then future defense acquisition reformers can begin studying 
and incorporating various debiasing techniques/structural changes into the broader fabric 
of reform initiatives.  
Based upon the overarching scope of this research, the following describes the 
specific scope limitations of our analysis. First, GAO and other defense acquisition reform 
reports have identified a wide range of problem areas that lead to poor acquisition 
outcomes. However, the scope of our research is limited to issues relating to GAO’s  
incentives narrative and decision biases. Second, this research focuses on assessing 
whether it is likely that cognitive decision biases significantly contribute to deviations from 
sound acquisition practices. Therefore, although debiasing techniques are a topic we 
recommend for further research, this is outside the scope of our research. Third, this paper 
provides an overview of cognitive biases, heuristics, and motivational biases; however, a 
comprehensive discussion of the expansive body of research related to behavioral decision 
theory is outside the scope of this research. Finally, the “nature of the underlying 
psychological mechanisms that lead to biased behavior is the subject of considerable 
debate” (Arnott, 2006, p. 59) (See Keren, 1990; Gigerenzer, 1991; 1996; Dawes & 
Mulford, 1996; as cited in Arnott, 2006, p. 59; see also Hogarth, 1981, 1987; Hilbert, 2012; 
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& Davis et al., 2005). Considering this, and since our analysis is not contingent upon these 
underlying mechanisms, it is not necessary for this paper to adopt a particular 
psychological theory of decision making.  
2. Sampled Case Studies 
We did not select case studies with the goal of determining the relative influence or 
impact of assessed decision biases, as compared between positive and negative acquisition 
outcomes. First, as noted in Sub-Section 3 within this section, determining which—and to 
what extent—decision biases ultimately contributed to poor acquisition outcomes is 
outside to scope of our research. Second, as detailed in our “Assumptions” Section, we 
accept GAO and DOD’s assertion that deviations from sound acquisition practices lead to 
poor acquisition outcomes. Therefore, our research focused only on identifying deviations 
from sound acquisition practices, and then assessing whether it was likely the decision was 
influenced by one or more decision biases. This approach did not necessitate comparing 
cases with positive and negative acquisition outcomes since we were not seeking to 
compare and contrast these to determine the relative influence or impact of the assessed 
decision biases. Additionally, although drawing conclusions regarding which decision 
biases were correlated with poor acquisition outcomes seems ideal, positive outcomes do 
not prove optimal decisions were made, or that these decisions were driven by knowledge 
and data (Reference the discussion of the “Success” bias in Chapter II). Explaining the 
failure of several popular business management books’ ability to identify companies that 
remained successful over time, Kahneman (2011) states “because luck plays a large role, 
the quality of leadership and management practices cannot be inferred reliably from 
observations of success” (p. 207). Essentially, it is possible for a decision maker to make 
the right decision for the wrong reasons. Conversely, an acquisition with poor outcomes 
may very well have been based on knowledge-based decisions and sound acquisition 
practices. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) case we studied was a good example 
of this. Although GAO (2018b) stated the ACV program was on track to “meet 
development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition 
milestones. … [with costs] on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the 
start of development” (p. 1), we found indications of numerous decision biases within the 
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case. Therefore, we did not compare and contrast case studies with positive and negative 
outcomes, and we limited our analysis to identifying and recognizing the likely decision 
biases associated with acquisition decisions which deviated from sound acquisition 
practices, regardless of outcome.  
3. Subjectivity of Assessing Decision Biases 
The process of reviewing case studies, and assessing decision biases is inherently 
subjective. The following are several unique considerations associated with our review.  
First, as detailed in Chapter III, we went to great lengths to ensure the consistency 
and validity of our coding assessments and methodologies. To accomplish this, we 
independently coded our first three case study transcripts, compared our results, assessed 
the root cause(s) of any coding discrepancies (if any), and revised our transcript coding 
methodologies and DBD accordingly. To ensure consistency, in one instance, we decided 
to predetermine a selection of assessed decision biases when coding biases related to 
concurrency strategies, which we encountered multiple times in the same case. However, 
although we found our independently assessed decision biases to be very consistent, we 
are cognizant that these assessments are subjective. Biases often may overlap, and multiple 
biases may be applicable to a single situation or decision. (Arnott, 2006, p. 59). Therefore, 
differing evaluator assessments are not necessarily indicative of a flawed research approach 
since the focus of this research does not necessitate absolute precision when differentiating 
between two distinct, yet similar cognitive biases. The primary focus of our research is to 
provide an illustrative view of which decision biases (cognitive or motivational) may have 
contributed to deviations from sound acquisition practices, from an HBP perspective. 
Therefore, differentiating between these two pivotal categories provided the most 
significant takeaways. Finally, although debiasing techniques are outside the scope of this 
research, it is worth noting that the utility of obtaining a high degree of accuracy among 
similar cognitive biases would be negligible since cognitive debiasing techniques are likely 
to be effective among similar cognitive biases (Davis et al., 2005). 
Second, some decision biases lack a clear consensus among decision bias 
researchers regarding whether they are driven by cognitive and/or motivational factors. 
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One significant example of this is the overconfidence bias. Although Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) indicated the overconfidence bias to be predominately cognitive, our 
review of decision science literature, including Kahneman’s later works, indicates the 
overconfidence bias is likely the result of a mixture of motivational and cognitive factors. 
Kahneman (2011) allows for this view in his description of the excessive optimism in 
planning forecasts, stating “errors in the initial budget are not always innocent. The authors 
of unrealistic plans are often driven by the desire to get the plan approved…supported by 
the knowledge that projects are rarely abandoned unfinished merely because of overruns 
in costs or completion times” (pp. 250–251). However, a synthesis between these two 
factors for the overconfidence bias and similar cognitive biases is outside the scope of this 
research. We recommend this as a focus of further study since the mechanics of the 
cognitive and motivational factors underlying the overconfidence bias are central to 
creating a synthesis between HBP and GAO’s incentives narrative. While most of the 
cognitive biases within our DBD are broadly considered to be purely cognitive in nature; 
Chapter II highlights how some of these biases lack a clear consensus regarding whether 
they are driven by cognitive and/or motivational factors. In our analysis and conclusions, 
we sought to highlight the ambiguity, but not necessarily come to a conclusion regarding 
whether these decision biases were considered cognitive, motivational, or a mixture of the 
two.  
Third, measuring or determining the relative influence or impact of assessed 
decision biases is outside the scope of this research. This is a valid topic for further study, 
but the inherent complexity of decision biases renders making such observations very 
difficult without extensive and controlled empirical research. Rodman (2015) states that “it 
is difficult to adequately prove the influence of heuristics and biases in field conditions; 
instead, much of the research in support of heuristics and biases is based on evidence 
uncovered in controlled laboratory conditions” (p. 20) (Klein, 2008; as cited in Rodman, 
2015). Therefore, our research focused on detecting the existence of cognitive biases in our 
case studies, not measuring their impact. We sought to identify deviations from sound 
acquisition practices; and then use our DBD to assess, within the context of the decision, 
whether it was likely the decision was influenced by one or more decision biases.  
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Fourth, our research is inherently limited by the “Search” bias since some biases 
that are likely to influence a decision maker are not evident within the format of a GAO 
case. An example of this is the group of five “Presentation” biases within our DBD. Since 
these biases are closely associated with how data are presented within actual decision 
documents or presentations, GAO case studies do not lend themselves well to identifying 
these cognitive biases.  
Finally, our research is limited in its ability to draw specific conclusions regarding 
the susceptibility of decision makers, programs, or stages of the acquisition cycle to 
particular decision biases. Attempting to do so would provide a false impression of 
conclusiveness. While our methodology meets the needs of our analysis, the sample size 
and other limitations detailed herein limits the extent that our findings can be generalized 
outside the specific circumstances encountered within each case study. However, we seek 
to draw tentative conclusions regarding specific circumstances and common themes 
encountered in our analysis.  
I. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following is a discussion of the relevant assumptions necessary to conduct our 
analysis. First, we accept GAO and DOD’s assertion that deviations from sound acquisition 
practices typically lead to poor acquisition outcomes. This assertion is well founded and 
has been thoroughly examined and validated by GAO and DOD. Second, when reviewing 
the GAO reports we ultimately used as case study transcripts, we generally accepted 
GAO’s assessments regarding whether the decision(s) in question were deviations from 
sound acquisition practices. However, we viewed these assessments in light of the DOD 
and/or Agency response(s) to GAO’s findings, and we acknowledge that deviations from 
sound acquisition practices are sometimes justifiable. Despite this, our research does not 
attempt to judge whether a decision was good or bad. Our research seeks to identify 
decision biases that could have led to deviations from sound acquisition practices. Third, 
we have established GAO and DOD’s KBA approach as a normative standard for 
identifying deviations from sound acquisition practices in our analysis. We also considered 
additional normative standards such as additional objectively defined sound acquisition 
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practices; along with widely accepted probabilistic, statistical, logical/rational, etc., 
normative standards, where applicable. According to Korteling et al. (2018), logical/
rational normative standards may include “non-contradictory reasoning or focusing on, and 
appropriately weighting relevant information while ignoring irrelevant information” (p. 2). 
Lastly, we have adopted the heuristics and biases paradigm (HBP) to guide our analysis. 
We believe HBP is superior to the naturalistic paradigm (NP), both in theory and practical 
application to the DAS. Since NP philosophically rejects the premise of using normative 
standards to identify deviations in rational behaviors, using NP would run counter to GAO 
and DOD’s KBA approach and other established normative principles (Davis et al., 2005; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). However, this decision does not pose a practical limitation 
since the two paradigms generally agree at a fundamental level, and a HBP/NP synthesis 
is unnecessary to achieve our research objectives. 
J. THESIS STATEMENT  
Deviations from sound acquisition practices which lead to poor acquisition 
outcomes are likely the result of a combination of incentive-driven and cognitive-driven 
decision biases. Therefore, to improve the implementation of sound acquisition practices, 
acquisition reform efforts must address both categories of decision biases. 
K. REPORT ORGANIZATION  
Chapter I provides necessary background and context regarding the focus of this 
research. Chapter II summarizes the extensive literature review we performed to inform 
our analysis and to develop our DBD. Chapter III details our analysis methodology and 
data used to answer our secondary research question 2c, and ultimately answer our primary 
research questions. Chapter IV discusses the results of our analysis and our findings. 
Chapter V details our conclusions, and provides recommendations for further research. 
L. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided necessary background and context regarding the focus 
of this research. Next, we examine the varied and expansive bodies of knowledge we 
reviewed to inform our analysis and to develop our DBD. 
27 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter I provides necessary background and context regarding the focus of this 
research. This chapter details the relevant literature we reviewed to inform our overall 
analysis, reviews various decision bias taxonomies necessary to develop our DBD, 
identifies common types of decision biases, and reviews the literature supporting GAO’s 
incentives narrative. First, we review relevant GAO reports and major acquisition reform 
studies’ findings concerning defense acquisition culture and incentives in order to evaluate 
the conclusiveness of GAO’s incentives narrative. Second, we examine relevant literature 
relating to decision biases and heuristics to ensure a sound theoretical understanding and 
consistent internal schema associated with decision biases. Our review also includes 
literature relating to decision biases within defense acquisition programs and defense 
acquisition culture, but our efforts revealed scant literature exists within this focus area. 
Third, we review several decision bias taxonomies in order to create a customized DBD. 
Finally, we provide a general overview of many of the significant cognitive and 
motivational decision biases we included in our DBD and encountered in our analysis.  
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION CULTURE AND INCENTIVES 
Whether the Defense Department’s scientists, engineers, and cost analysts 
will be successful in their efforts to compensate for contractors’ optimism 
can be determined conclusively only through the stern test of time. 
—Scherer (1964) 
1. Development of GAO’s Incentives Narrative 
In a seminal study that established GAO’s incentives narrative, GAO (1992) 
reviewed 81 of their previous works on defense acquisition programs from 1976—1991. 
“To identify the underlying factors [believed to] contribute significantly to recurring 
acquisition difficulties” (p. 13). The authors found that “occurrences such as performance 
shortfalls, schedule delays, and cost increases … should also be viewed as the logical 
consequences of acquisition culture” (p. 35). The report defines defense acquisition culture 
as the “collective patterns of behavior exhibited by the numerous participants in the 
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acquisition process and the incentives for that behavior,” (p. 2) and stated that this culture 
has evolved to become “a vehicle for meeting the diverse needs of participants” (p. 2). 
GAO describes how the cultural participants’ needs shape acquisition decisions: 
Weapons have become integral to policy decisions, definitions of roles and 
functions, justifications of budget levels and shares, service reputations, 
influence of oversight organizations, distribution of funds to localities, and 
the industrial base. Programs are also important to individual careers. For 
example, a program manager’s success depends on getting results, and in 
acquisitions, results mean getting the program through the next major 
milestone and into the field. Thus, a program manager’s strongest 
motivation is to keep the program moving and to protect it from 
interruption. … Strong incentives for supporting programs permeate other 
levels of the acquisition process as well. … To a service branch, it may be 
perpetuating a mission. To a service, it may be securing its reputation and 
its share of the budget. To a Member of Congress, it may be responding to 
constituency interests. To service executives, whose tenures are often 
relatively short, weapon systems can be an effective way to leave a legacy. 
(GAO, 1992, p. 38) 
The report further states “these needs create incentives for pushing programs and 
encouraging undue optimism, parochialism, and other compromises of good judgment” (p. 
35). GAO also highlights how weak incentives to make difficult choices that may disrupt, 
restrict, or cancel programs often are overcome by the aforementioned more powerful 
incentives. In other words, GAO believes the presence of these systemic incentives creates 
incentive-driven decision biases which lead to poor acquisition outcomes. To mitigate 
these incentives the report makes two overarching recommendations: “(1) to uproot 
traditional seats of parochialism and self-interest and (2) to enforce a set of incentives—
both positive and negative—to motivate participants to take actions that are consistent with 
better program outcomes” (pp. 62–63). History, however, has shown the implementation 
of many of the report’s recommendations have failed to achieve the desired results, and 
little has done to change the fundamental incentives highlighted in the report. DOD 
officials at the time did not concur with the report’s conclusions regarding culture and 
incentives, attributing poor acquisition outcomes to “a lack of discipline and to the 
pressures of the Cold War” (pp. 13). Finally, the authors clarified that the report did not 
represent the “singular correct view of the issues discussed” (p. 2), and made subjective 
judgements using “corporate knowledge,” in order to “extract lessons learned and to 
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concentrate on the cultural reasons behind persistent problems” (p. 13). It is critical to our 
analysis to thoroughly note the report’s emphasis regarding the inconclusiveness of their 
findings stating: 
This report does not present the answers; there are no easy ones. However, 
in the following pages we pose challenges, in the form of questions, we 
believe can help acquisition participants change the incentives-and the 
culture-of weapons acquisition. These views necessarily involve judgments 
and are subject to debate. However, the specifics of these challenges should 
not overshadow their general intent, which is to spotlight the acquisition 
culture as a proper focus of prescriptions. (GAO, 1992, p. 59) 
We have gone into great detail regarding the 1992 GAO reports findings because it 
has defined GAO’s incentive narrative for the past 25 years. 
A thorough review of GAO reports which reference or address the incentives 
narrative reveals the narrative to be effectively the same as the original incentives narrative 
proposed by GAO’s 1992 report (GAO, 1992; 2004; 2005a; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015b ; 
2015c ; 2015d; 2017). In fact, most of GAO’s subsequent reports borrow language from 
large sections of the 1992 report and/or paraphrased sections from each other verbatim 
(GAO, 1992, 2004, 2005a, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2017). Among 
subsequent reports, descriptions of pressures and incentives, and proposed ways to address 
them have varied slightly from the 1992 report; however, these variations mainly serve to 
further emphasize and explain the original report’s findings. At first glance, the 
homogeneity of GAO’s commentary on the DOD acquisition culture and incentives may 
indicate their conclusions are well established and substantiated; however, this view is not 
supported by the 1992 report itself since it did not claim to be conclusive, and specifically 
detailed how the study was based upon subjective assessments. Considering this, it seems 
reasonable to view the uniformity of findings in subsequent GAO reports as a symptom of 
a subjective organizational assumption that has not been questioned for almost three 
decades, despite continued poor acquisition outcomes. 
Finally, it appears that GAO has failed to consider additional and/or alternative 
causal influences for decision biases theories developed within the decision science 
literature in almost any of their published works. We come to this conclusion after 
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performing multiple Google and Google Scholar Boolean “AND” searches using the term 
“Government Accountability Office” combined with multiple variations of each of the 
following terms/authors: “heuristic,” “cognitive bias,” “decision bias,” “Kahneman,” 
“Tversky,” and “bounded rationality.” Excluding instances where the search term or name 
was used outside the context of decision theory, only one GAO report on Social Security 
briefly referenced Kahneman et al.’s (1990) research into the endowment effect 
(Kahneman et al., 1990; as cited in GAO, 2016c. These results indicate that GAO has not 
incorporated or even considered more than 60 years of fundamental advances in behavioral 
decision theory. 
In summary, GAO believes poor acquisition outcomes are partially the result of 
various incentives that favor optimistic perspectives that compromises good judgment 
when making decisions. A review of the history of GAO’s published commentaries on 
DOD acquisition culture and incentives strongly suggests GAO’s incentives narrative is 
almost solely based on a GAO report conducted more than 25 years ago. We also found 
this report did not represent itself as conclusive, admittedly based its conclusions on 
subjective judgements and “corporate knowledge,” and was intended to spur further 
inquiry and debate (GAO, 1992). In spite of this, it appears the 1992 report’s conclusions 
have largely persisted unchanged and unchallenged for over 25 years, despite continued 
poor acquisition outcomes. 
2. Influential Acquisition Reform Reports 
This section examines other influential acquisition reform studies and reports’ 
findings and conclusions concerning defense acquisition culture and incentives to create a 
better contextual understanding of GAO’s assumptions. To do this, Fox and Schwartz’s 
excellent overview on historical DOD acquisition reform efforts was reviewed to identify 
influential acquisition reform initiative reports and studies which address elements of the 
incentives narrative (Fox, 2011; Reform of the Defense Acquisition System, 2014). This 
analysis covered DOD acquisition reform efforts spanning 60 years, starting with the three-
year Harvard research project, began by Peck and Scherer in 1959, and ending with the 
now defunct Better Buying Power initiatives which ended in 2015 (Fox, 2011, p. 35; GAO, 
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2019, p. 143). Although not an exhaustive overview, the following sections highlights 
significant acquisition reform studies and reports’ findings and conclusions relating to our 
research. Although we endeavored to keep each report’s findings within its’ original 
context, we viewed each report using both the rational choice model (RCM) underlying 
GAO’s incentives narrative, and the heuristics and biases paradigm (HBP). Accordingly, 
in the following sections, we include parenthetical references to decision biases that are 
related to the respective report’s finding, where applicable. The referenced decision biases 
are discussed in detail in Chapter II, Sub-Section D/E and Table 2. 
a. 1962—The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis 
Merton Peck and Frederic Scherer of Harvard University conducted a three-year 
research project on the economic factors underlying the DOD weapons acquisition process 
(Fox, 2009). These efforts culminated in the following two volumes: The Weapons 
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Peck & Scherer, 1962), and The Weapons 
Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives (Scherer, 1964). Citing the six fundamental 
problems studied by Peck and Scherer, Fox (2009) points out that acquisition reform efforts 
have continued to attempt to solve the same intractable problems as Peck and Scherer. 
While Peck and Scherer acknowledged the importance of empirical and statistical research, 
they stated that due to limitations imposed by time, manpower, and the nature of the subject 
matter; their primary research method was compiling detailed “case studies of 12 advanced 
weapon system and 7 commercial product development programs” (Scherer, 1964, p. 12), 
spanning from 1945–1960.  
In the first volume, Peck and Scherer (1962) extensively described and analyzed 
the DOD acquisition process, and the nature of the competitive forces and other 
environmental factors that influence this process. Although Peck and Scherer do not 
specifically discuss defense acquisition culture or key elements of the incentives narrative, 
the following findings and conclusions are relevant to our research subject. 
Peck and Scherer detailed an interaction between objective analysis and subjective 
interpersonal confidence when facing technological uncertainty, stating “a good technical 
feasibility evaluation must consider not only the state of the art in a very objective sense, 
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but also the competence, insight, motivation, and other characteristics of those who propose 
to develop the weapon” (1962, p. 246). Citing two examples of programs studied, they 
further suggested that “when technological uncertainty is substantial, it may be desirable 
to base weapons program decisions on something resembling interpersonal confidence 
rather than, or as well as, on objective analysis” (Peck & Scherer, 1962, p. 246). Peck and 
Scherer deemed the value of subjective interpersonal confidence and knowledge of 
objective technical considerations to be greatest at the lower organizational levels such as 
the individual services. However, they also cautioned that “subjective confidence is not an 
infallible predictor of success … [and] the individual services have been less than 
completely impartial in their analysis of the ‘objective’ data, and they have often failed to 
represent the broad national interest, especially when advocating their own weapons 
systems in the face of interservice rivalries” (Peck & Scherer, 1962, pp. 248–249) 
(Reference discussion of “Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” and “Selectivity” 
decision biases in Chapter II, Sub-Section D/E and Table 2). However, while they 
characterized DOD-level program decisions as generally more objective, they also 
cautioned against the “propensity of functional groups to ignore important parts of the 
problem in their analyses” (p. 249) (Reference “Attenuation” and “Selectivity” decision 
biases). If their assessment of the influence of subjective interpersonal confidence in the 
face of technological uncertainty is accurate, it is highly likely that such assessments could 
be clouded by a broad spectrum of cognitive and motivational decision biases.  
Peck and Scherer (1962) concluded that uncertainties that negatively impact the 
quality of program decisions stemmed “partly from the optimistic bias of program 
advocates” (p. 322) (Reference “Overconfidence” and “Misaligned Individual Incentives” 
decision biases). They also concluded that, while a program decision model that seeks to 
select programs which offer the greatest overall value “is applicable for descriptive 
purposes and may have some value in actual decision making” (p. 322); “as the level of 
[program] investment accumulates, its utility becomes circumscribed by political and 
psychological considerations” (Peck & Scherer, 1962, p. 322) (Reference “Escalation,” 
“Misaligned Individual Incentives,” and “Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” 
decision biases). These findings are relevant to our research subject since they allude to a 
33 
decision making environment that is significantly influenced by motivational and cognitive 
decision biases.  
b. 1964—The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives  
In the second volume, Scherer (1964) examined the role of contractual and 
competitive incentives associated with defense acquisition programs. This volume’s focus 
is primarily on contractor incentives, and does not specifically discuss defense acquisition 
culture or key elements of the “incentives narrative.” However, the following findings 
regarding contractor behaviors are likely analogous to their government counterparts.  
First, Scherer described the tendency of contractors to maintain the status quo: “a 
technical group tends to become committed to a certain approach or solution to a problem, 
and as long as it works satisfactorily, no serious effort is made to seek fundamentally better 
solutions” (p. 23). Scherer found this tendency toward the status quo to be less severe when 
spurred by significant technical competition, and detailed valid reasons and situations why 
a contractor may make a rational decision to maintain the status quo. However, he further 
referenced examples where contractors irrationally clung to an objectively inferior 
technical approach, rationalizing away and/or ignoring the threat of the rival technical 
approach (1964, p. 25) (Reference “Conservatism” and “Attenuation” decision biases).  
Next, of the programs studied, Scherer (1964) found that cost prediction errors 
resulted in an average 220% cost overrun, and were largely driven by “competitive 
optimism” (p. 27; see also Peck & Scherer, 1962) (Reference “Misaligned Individual 
Incentives” decision bias). Citing contractors’ competitive optimism, Scherer (1964) 
emphasized the importance for government personnel to “independently adjust contractor 
estimates to a more realistic basis” (p. 29), but expressed doubt in the government’s ability 
to do this, stating “technical personnel have been somewhat optimistic about their ability 
to identify contractors’ optimism” (p. 29) (Reference “Overconfidence” decision bias and 
related discussion of the “Dunning-Kruger effect”). Scherer also noted government 
program personnel represented another significant source of cost prediction errors: 
Government operating agencies have often encouraged contractors to 
estimate costs optimistically, recognizing that higher headquarters might be 
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shocked out of supporting a program whose true costs were revealed at the 
outset. They have sought to disclose cost increases only gradually, after 
programs have gained momentum and cancellation has become difficult. 
(1964, p. 28) (Reference “Strategic Misrepresentation” decision bias) 
Scherer found that in either case, “decision makers at higher levels … often lacked the 
technical expertise needed to adjust contractor and operating agency cost estimates to a 
more realistic basis” (1964, p. 28) (Reference “Overconfidence” decision bias and related 
discussion of the “Dunning-Kruger effect”).  
Lastly, Scherer (1964) noted that contractor and government acquisition 
participants systematically underestimated the risk that adding additional and sometimes 
unnecessary technical elements would pose to the development of the overall system. 
Scherer quoted former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, stating “He criticized the 
tendency of military planners ‘to forget that every additional bit of complexity you add to 
your operation tends to degrade … over-all efficiency” (1964, p. 37) (Reference 
“Conjunction” decision bias). 
c. 1970—Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission)  
According to Fox (2009) the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (a.k.a. Fitzhugh 
Commission) was established in 1970 by President Richard Nixon. This panel’s charter 
was very broad, but included reviewing “department procurement policies and practices as 
they related to costs, time, and quality” (Fox, 2009, p. 46; DOD, 1970). The report had 
little to say with respect to the incentives narrative, briefly alluded to an element of the 
incentives narrative, and highlighting the problem of parochialism in defense acquisition 
program. In a discussion of the limitations of cost estimates, the report briefly alludes to an 
element of the incentives narrative, stating “Other factors, however, also contribute to the 
inaccuracies of cost estimates. The understandable incentives to sell a development 
program, either to senior decision-makers in the Executive Branch or to Congress, can 
influence cost estimates to be on the low side” (DOD, 1970, p. 83). However, the report 
does not elaborate on this topic further. Lastly, the report touches on the problem of 
parochialism within DOD. As detailed further within this chapter, DOD and GAO’s 
descriptions of parochialism align with the definition of the “Misaligned Perception of 
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Corporate Goals” motivational bias within our DBD. The report describes the problem of 
parochialism as follows: 
The evolution of defense organization since 1947 has not substantially 
reduced the inherent difficulties arising from the fact that the division of 
roles and missions among the Military Departments is still based 
fundamentally on distinctions between land, sea and air forces which have 
become increasingly less relevant. This results in continued adversary 
relations between the Military Services, which … severely inhibit the 
achievement of economy and effectiveness required for adequate defense 
within available resources. The continuing interservice competition 
seriously degrades the decision-making process through obfuscation of 
issues and alternatives, and leads to attempts to circumvent decisions, 
repeated efforts to reopen issues that have already been decided, and slow, 
unenthusiastic implementation of policies to which a Service objects. 
(DOD, 1970, p. 21) 
d. 1972—Congressional Commission on Government Procurement  
The Congressional Commission on Government Procurement was appointed by 
Congress in 1972 to “identify the causes of weapons cost overruns and to propose new 
methods of cost control” (Fox, 2009, p. 41). The commission’s report included discussions 
on three intertwined concepts that are relevant to our research: parochialism, concurrency, 
and program advocacy. The report states “Entire system costs cannot be estimated 
realistically during its early development. Institutional arrangements [i.e., parochialism] 
and advocacy pressures tend to drive cost estimates downward and to produce overly 
optimistic schedule and performance appraisals” (DOD, 1972, p. 99). The report identifies 
six factors that cause “avoidable cost increases” (p. 100). Two of the six are 1) system 
advocacy (i.e., program advocacy) and premature commitment, and 2) concurrency 
strategies. We believe the first of these two, identified as “system advocacy and premature 
commitment” (p. 100), incorrectly conflates these two concepts. While we believe these 
concepts can and likely often co-occur, we do not believe they are mutually inclusive 
concepts. Setting this aside, we found the report strongly emphasized the concept of 
program advocacy as a fundamental factor in overly optimistic cost, schedule, and/or 
performance estimates stating: “Acquisition planning often has relied on cost and schedule 
estimates prepared by advocates of a proposed new system. The advocates understandably 
tended to minimize unknowns and defer the resolution of uncertainties to later stages” 
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(DOD, 1972, p. 104). From an RCM perspective, this statement clearly describes incentive-
driven behaviors, consistent with GAO’s incentives narrative. However, from an HBP 
perspective, these decisions might have been influenced by a motivational bias such as 
“Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” bias. However, the HBP perspective would 
also consider whether these decisions were also influenced by cognitive biases such as the 
“Desire,” “Overconfidence,” “Attenuation,” and “Complexity” biases (to name a few). The 
report further describes program advocacy stating “All levels in a department, in industry, 
and even in Congress can become parties to the ‘selling’ of programs founded on 
unrealistic and unattainable system cost goals” (DOD, 1972, pp. 99–100). Second, the 
report describes a practice we encountered prevalently in our literature review and analysis, 
concurrency. The report describes this practice as follows:  
Committing to extensive production when much development, test, 
evaluation, and redesign still remain to be done usually leads to major 
retrofit and modification costs. Components, equipment, and tools can be 
made obsolete by design changes as the development progresses. (DOD, 
1972, p. 100) 
The report identifies initial operational capability deadlines as commonly pushing 
a program to implement concurrency strategies. Lastly, the report also suggested that 
overly optimistic cost estimates might be the result of parochialism:  
Competition exists among programs intended to fulfill the same 
organizational missions and between proposed new programs and ongoing 
programs. Each agency component must “sell” its programs in order to 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and future status” (p. 104) 
The report concluded “Some increase from an initial estimate for a major system is 
almost certain to occur” (p. 111), and identified optimism of program advocates as an 
inevitability that “should be compensated for in estimates” (DOD, 1972, p. 111). We found 
the report’s findings and conclusions relating to program advocacy and parochialism to be 
most closely related to GAO’s incentives narrative.  
e. 1986—Blue Ribbon Commission (Packard Commission)  
According to Fox (2009), in 1985, President Ronald Reagan appointed the Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense (a.k.a. the Packard Commission) to “review the entire 
37 
weapons acquisition process and recommend reforms for improvement” (p. 120). 
However, Fox’s summary and our own review of the report’s findings touched on the topics 
of acquisition culture, incentives, or other subjects directly relevant to our research (Fox, 
2009; DOD, 1986). 
f. Conclusion 
According to Fox (2009), the 1992 GAO report that established GAO’s incentives 
narrative “was unique among acquisition reform studies in that it stressed the impact of the 
acquisition culture” (p. 189). As far as we could find, this statement by Fox is correct. Our 
review of these influential acquisition reports indicate the incentives narrative (within the 
context of defense acquisition) was established by GAO’s 1992 report. We found the 
aforementioned acquisition reform reports provided insights into topics relevant to our 
research, such as program advocacy, overconfidence, concurrency, and parochialism. 
However, while these insights provide context and background relating to our analysis and 
findings, we found no report that directly contributed to or provided empirical research to 
establish or support GAO’s incentives narrative.  
B. DECISION BIASES AND HEURISTICS 
1. System 1 / System 2 Theory 
Kahneman (2011, p. 13) used the metaphor of the mind operating as two systems, 
System 1 and System 2. He based his work off of William James’ dual-process theory, and 
used the metaphor first coined by Stanovich and West (2000). Kahneman (2011) describes 
System 2 as the “slow” rational deliberate system. This is the function of our minds we are 
most familiar with. He describes System 1 as the “fast” intuitive system that is responsible 
for influencing much of our decisions we attribute to the rational workings of System 2. 
The workings of these two systems can easily be seen through the experience of learning 
to drive a car. At first, our System 2 brain is responsible for making sure our hands are 
positioned correctly on the steering wheel, consciously thinking about which pedal to push, 
etc. However, most adults subconsciously end up delegating this task to System 1, making 
the process seem intuitive and automatic. System 1 is largely responsible for the learning 
curves we see while a person intuitively masters a task. However, to remain efficient, 
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System 1 must develop heuristics to operate in a world where our senses are bombarded 
with millions of unique stimuli throughout our lives. Heuristics themselves are necessary 
to live, and enable us to quickly react on limited information. However, much of the 
cognitive biases Kahneman details are the results of these heuristics. In his book, 
Kahneman also detailed how, when prompted, System 2 can take over and correct for a 
System 1 error. For instance, at the sound of a balloon popping behind us, our System 1 
takes over, and we jump; but then System 2 takes over, and we are able to compose 
ourselves. The System 1 / System 2 theory is the foundation Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work was built upon, with regard to cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2011) 
2. Heuristics 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) provide a simple explanation of heuristics, 
followed shortly thereafter by a very technical definition of generic heuristic processes: 
When confronted with a difficult question people often answer an easier one 
instead, usually without being aware of the substitution. … We will say that 
judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a specified 
target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that 
object -- the heuristic attribute -- which comes more readily to mind. Many 
judgments are made by this process of attribute substitution. … Because the 
target attribute and the heuristic attribute are different, the substitution of 
one for the other inevitably introduces systematic biases. (pp. 4–5) 
The use of intuitive judgements and heuristics is inherently human, and does not 
necessarily lead to poor decisions. According to Kahneman, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between heuristic-driven intuitive judgements and expert judgements supported 
by prolonged practice and adequate feedback (2011, pp. 11, 242). For instance, a chess 
master relies on expert intuition, rather than heuristics when making decisions. Requiring 
a chess master to justify his/her ability to instantaneously read the condition of a game in 
play, or to explain every move in context with his/her overall strategy would be 
counterproductive. The converse problem occurs when experts make judgments based on 
simplifying heuristics, but believe their decision was based on expert intuition. However, 
the naturalistic school of thought would argue heuristic-driven intuitive judgements and 
expert judgements are both driven by heuristics (Davis et al., 2005). Nevertheless, both 
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schools of thought (HBP & NP) agree that when evaluating the efficacy of an expert’s 
intuition, “subjective confidence is not a good diagnostic of accuracy [because] judgments 
that answer the wrong question [i.e., heuristics] can be made with high confidence” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 243). In addition, the use of heuristics can be appropriate in certain 
situations which require quick decisions, and where the methodical process of deliberation 
would result in disastrous inaction. Making these distinctions can be difficult, and requires 
further study to effectively mitigate bias within decision making without accidently 
stripping the process of expert intuition or the appropriate use of heuristics. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) initially described three fundamental heuristics which lead to 
judgmental biases/fallacies: representativeness, availability, and adjustment and anchoring. 
Kahneman later incorporated the affect heuristic, proposed by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
and MacGregor (2002), to this list (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003, 2011). 
C. DECISION BIAS TAXONOMIES 
Since there is not a widely accepted taxonomy or authoritative dictionary of 
decision and/or cognitive biases, we reviewed several decision bias taxonomies in order to 
adapt them into a customized DBD. The decision bias taxonomies we reviewed were 
judged based on our subjective assessment of each taxonomy’s comprehensiveness, 
descriptiveness, empirical/research support, and utility of the taxonomy’s classification 
strategy. We also favored taxonomies that were simple, logical, and independent of a 
particular theoretical model. Table 1 lists the taxonomies we reviewed in alphabetical 
order. 
Table 1. Decision Bias Taxonomies Reviewed 
Reviewed Taxonomy Reference # of Identified Decision Biases 
# of Identified 
Bias Categories 
Arnott (1998, 2006) 37 6 
Baron (1988) 53 5 
Bazerman & Moore (2009) 12 3 
Carter, Kaufmann, & Michel (2007) 76 9 
Hilbert (2012) 8 - 
Hogarth (1987) 38 4 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) 20 3 
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Reviewed Taxonomy Reference # of Identified Decision Biases 
# of Identified 
Bias Categories 
Lovallo & Sibony (2010) 17 5 
Montibeller & Winterfeldt (2015) 26 3 
Remus & Kottemann (1986) 24 5 
Virine & Trumper (2007) 69 10 
Although not a taxonomy, a single bias was added from Jones and Euske (1991). 
 
From our review, we ultimately assembled a customized DBD consisting of 44 
individual biases, divided into 8 bias categories; which drew largely from Arnott’s (1998, 
2006) taxonomy, partly from Lovallo and Sibony’s (2010) taxonomy, and a single bias was 
added from Jones and Euske (1991) after the analysis had begun. 
Arnott’s (1998, 2006) taxonomy of 37 individual cognitive biases, which was 
divided into 6 bias categories, became the backbone of our DBD. We readily accept that 
Arnott’s taxonomy is not perfect, but Arnott’s taxonomy fits for our research needs for the 
following reasons: 1) It can be applied to many models of behavioral decision theory, but 
is not beholden to any particular one (1998, p. 33). 2) It is logical and internally consistent. 
3) It identifies decision biases that are generally accepted and supported by empirical 
evidence rather than theoretical conjecture (1998, p. 3). 4) It is practically organized due 
to its intended use within the applied discipline of decision support systems (DSS) (1998, 
p. 30). 5) It critically examines and incorporates elements of many other decision bias 
taxonomies (1998, pp. 23–33). 6) It helpfully provides cognates (synonymous, similar, or 
related decision biases) for each bias to allow for consistency among the widely varying 
and overlapping terminologies used within various fields of study (1998, p. 23). 7) Finally, 
although this was not originally a consideration, we found a comprehensive RAND study 
of modern decision science (Davis et al., 2005, p. 13) to have also largely adopted Arnott’s 
taxonomy. Davis et al. (2005) clarified that Arnott’s taxonomy consisted of “unmotivated 
biases, as distinct from motivated biases” (p. 13).  
Since the Arnott taxonomy did not include motivational or social biases, the 
remaining seven individual biases and two bias categories were adopted from two other 
sources. Six of the remaining individual biases and two bias categories were incorporated 
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from Lovallo and Sibony’s (2010) taxonomy. Finally, since we did not have a term to 
describe the incentive-driven behaviors detailed in our third case study, strategic 
misrepresentation (Jones & Euske, 1991) was incorporated at that time. While strategic 
misrepresentation is a conscious decision rather than a cognitive or motivational bias, it is 
relevant to our research because the behavior is typically incentive-driven (Jones & Euske). 
Therefore, for simplicity, strategic misrepresentation has been classified as a motivational 
bias. 
D. COGNITIVE DECISION BIASES 
This section will provide an overview of several specific cognitive decision biases 
we encountered most prevalently in our analysis and will provide the reader with a 
foundation for the discussion of our findings in Chapter IV. For each bias, we provide a 
brief summary of the bias; an example of how the bias could manifest in a DOD weapon 
system acquisition environment; and a selection of relevant research, along with any 
situational indicators and/or conditions where the bias is likely to occur. It is important to 
note here that the cognitive biases within Arnott’s taxonomy “are not necessarily as discrete 
as the taxonomy implies, and that they are likely to overlap in definition and effect” (2006, 
p. 59; see also Carter et al., 2007, p. 634; Sage, 1981, p. 3.14). In addition, as detailed in 
Chapter I, for biases lacking a clear consensus regarding whether they are purely cognitive, 
we detail the ambiguity and recommend further study. As discussed in Chapter I, the body 
of knowledge and experimental evidence relating to cognitive biases is vast, robust, and is 
generalizable to a broad range of fields of study (Heuer, 1999, p. 113). However, 
considering the limited scope of this research, the discussion of each bias is limited to a 
general overview in order to provide the reader with a foundation for the discussion of our 
findings.  
1. Anchoring and Adjustment 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the anchoring and adjustment bias (a.k.a. anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic) as follows: “Adjustments from an initial position are usually 
insufficient” (p. 4). This bias comes from a tendency to root oneself to an initial value, and 
then fail to adequately adjust for subsequent information when making decisions. 
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Individuals suffering from this bias will use a focal point as a reference (anchor), but rely 
too heavily or fail to appropriately adjust from this reference point, even when it is random 
or arbitrary, which can ultimately have a serious impact on the decision they ultimately 
make (Arnott, 1998, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2011). Although the 
use of anchors in making decisions under uncertainty is not inherently irrational, failing to 
appropriately adjust from an anchor, especially when the anchor is random or arbitrary, is 
not considered a result of a rational choice. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the anchoring and 
adjustment bias. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found test subjects estimated the product 
of “1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8” at a median estimate of 512, but another group of test 
subjects estimated the product of “8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1” at a median estimate of 
2,250. They also found test subjects’ estimates of the percentage of African nations in the 
United Nations were influenced higher or lower by observing a number on a rigged wheel 
of fortune that they used as an arbitrary anchor (p. 1128). Kahneman (2011) details how 
this bias, even when it is random or arbitrary, can affect our ability to accurately estimate 
age, length and volume (Leboeuf & Shafir), and temperature (Mussweiler & Strack); 
realtors’ estimates for the value of a house (Northcraft & Neale); and even prison sentences 
assessed by judges (Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2002) (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 119–
127). Joyce and Biddle (1981) found the professional judgement of experienced auditors 
to be influenced by the manipulation of “normatively irrelevant” anchors (p. 144). 
However, there are limits to this bias. Chapman and Johnson (1994) found the presence of 
the anchoring and adjustment bias was reduced or eliminated in the presence of 
“implausibly extreme” anchors or with anchors presented on “incompatible scales” (pp. 
1,4). In terms of the Kahneman’s (2011) discussion of heuristics and the System 1/System 
2 theory, Chapman and Johnson’s findings could be explained as System 2 overriding a 
System 1 error.  
2. Attenuation 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the attenuation bias (a.k.a. best guess strategy & 
ignoring uncertainty) as follows: “A decision making situation can be simplified by 
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ignoring or significantly discounting the level of uncertainty” (p. 5; see also Carter et al., 
2007, p. 636). This bias acts to oversimplify a decision making process by ignoring, 
overlooking, or excluding information (or other uncertainties) relevant to the decision. 
(Arnott, 1998, 2006). For example, a weapons program could suffer from this bias if 
decision makers oversimplify or discount the level of risk or vulnerabilities associated with 
the system’s or sub-systems’ susceptibility to cybersecurity threats. While limiting the 
amount of information considered is a fundamental and necessary mental process when 
making efficient judgements under uncertainty, attenuation is not logical because a 
decision maker should not arbitrarily or inconsistently ignore possibly relevant information 
when making a decision.  
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the attenuation 
bias. Describing a similar phenomenon, best-guess strategy, Gettys, Kelly, and Peterson 
(1973) found physicians were more likely to ignore the possible implications of less likely 
events, instead following the optimal probabilistic decision model. Gettys et al. found that 
test subjects exhibited a predictable “inappropriate response of concentrating almost 
exclusively on the intermediate hypothesis which was his best guess” (1973, p. 7). Next, 
Slovic (1975) analyzed how test subjects chose between two alternatives, each with 
differing advantages and disadvantages for primary and secondary characteristics. The first 
alternative was designed to be advantageous for a primary characteristic, but had a 
secondary characteristic that was “so inferior … that this disadvantage canceled its 
[overall] advantage” (p. 280); and vice versa for the second alternative. Slovic found that 
test subjects exhibited a “reliance on easily justifiable aspects to the neglect of other 
important factors could lead one to reject alternatives whose overall utilities (assessed 
outside the choice context) are superior to those of the chosen alternative” (1975, p. 287). 
Finally, Stoker (1996) described the attenuation bias as an expected statistical 
mathematical function, where attenuation is explained by the process of “data smoothing” 
(eliminating statistical noise or outliers from data) when predicting a random variable. In 
other words, Stoker concluded that the attenuation bias arises when a decision maker 
eliminates what he/she determines to be unimportant or unlikely variables in a decision.  
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3. Complexity 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the complexity bias (a.k.a. decision environment) as 
follows: “Time pressure, information overload and other environmental factors can 
increase the perceived complexity of a task” (p. 7; see also Carter et al., 2007, p. 636). 
Hogarth (1987) defines this bias as follows: Complexity induced by time pressure, 
information overload, distractions lead to reduced consistency of judgement … [and 
consequently] information processing may be quite superficial” (p. 220). The complexity 
bias occurs when decision quality is negatively affected by environmental factors (a.k.a. 
task stress) such as time pressure, perceived importance of the decision, an overwhelming 
amount of data, inputs required from many stakeholders, and/or the novelty of the decision. 
(Arnott, 1998, 2006). The Yerkes-Dodson Law describes the relationship between task 
stress and decision quality as a bell curve, where decision quality increases with task stress 
to a point, but then decreases as task stress increases beyond this point (Yates, 1990; as 
cited by Arnott, 1998). Since environmental factors such as time pressure, novelty of 
decisions, information overload, importance, voluminous data, etc., are a practically 
defining characteristics of weapons programs, a milestone decision authority’s decision 
quality is likely to suffer from excessive task stress when assessing whether a program 
should move to the next phase of the acquisition process. While the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
makes intuitive sense, the quality of purely rational decisions should not vary based upon 
the level of task stress. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the complexity 
bias. Pollay’s (1970) experimental findings contradicted the normative assumption that 
decision time increases directly with the difficulty of a decision problem. Pollay found that 
test subjects took more time to choose among four good alternatives, but took less time to 
choose among two inferior and two good alternatives. However, when additional 
complexity was introduced (describing the alternatives along eight versus two dimensions), 
the results were reversed, indicating test subjects were more likely to give up or choose 
hastily when asked to choose among four complex good alternatives (Pollay, 1970). Next, 
Wright (1974) found that when decision makers are faced with environmental factors such 
as time pressure, distraction, or information overload; they were prone to compensate by 
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using simplifying strategies that deviated from the “optimal rational strategy” (p. 560). In 
other words, Wright found that when faced with task stress, decision makers often resort 
to using satisficing strategies and shortcuts, which in this study, manifested as subjects 
placing a disproportionate weight on negative evidence (Wright, 1974; see also Einhorn, 
1971). Additionally, Payne (1982) concluded that “information processing in decision 
making is highly contingent on the demands of the task” (p. 399).  
Maule and Edland (1997) found that decision makers altered their decision making 
processes when faced with time pressure. These alterations included reducing decision 
quality, modifying risk-taking tendencies, focusing on personal knowledge versus external 
sources of information, altering underlying cognitive processes, placing disproportionate 
weight on different information sources and/or positive versus negative information 
sources, and “reducing the overall attractiveness of alternatives” (Maule & Edland, 1997, 
p. 201; see also Ordonez & Benson, 1997). In other words, decision makers resorted to a 
wide range of simplifying mental shortcuts (heuristics) when faced with time pressure (See 
also Pitz & Sachs, 1984, pp. 145–146). 
4. Conjunction 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the conjunction bias (a.k.a. inertial ψ effect) as follows: 
“Probability is often over-estimated in compound conjunctive problems” (p. 8; see also 
Carter et al., 2007, p. 637). Humans are terrible intuitive statisticians, and the same can 
even be said of professional statisticians (Kahneman, 2011, p. 5). According to Arnott, 
building projects and complex system development programs are particularly vulnerable 
to the conjunction bias because multiple constituent elements must be completed on time 
and correctly for the end product to be completed on time (1998; see also Arnott, 2006). 
Therefore, this bias is likely to exist in the defense acquisition environment since, 
according to Fox (2009), “Major weapon systems development and production programs 
are technologically advanced and complex … [and] are often designed to achieve 
performance levels never before realized, using many components and some materials 
never before used in military applications” (p. 6). For example, for a major weapon system 
where several milestones on the project’s critical path must be completed on schedule for 
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the final system to be completed on time, the conjunction bias systematically encourages 
acquisition participants to underestimate the likelihood of schedule delays. In fact, major 
weapon system acquisitions are uniquely at risk of succumbing to the conjunction bias 
because these systems can have scores of sub-systems and thousands of constituent 
elements that have to all work together (Fox, 2009). In a normative probabilistic sense, the 
conjunction bias is irrational because decisions relying upon assessments of probability 
should line up with objective probabilities. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the conjunction 
bias. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) made the following observation: “Studies of choice 
among gambles and judgments of probability indicate that people tend to overestimate the 
probability of conjunctive events and to underestimate the probability of disjunctive 
events” (p. 1129). Bar-Hillel (1973) presented test subjects with a choice of variations of 
the following three probabilistic events: 1) Pick one red marble out of a bag of 50 white 
and 50 red marbles (i.e., a simple event with an objective probability of 50%), 2) Pick seven 
red marbles in a row out of a bag of 10 white and 90 red marbles (i.e., a conjunctive event 
with an objective probability of 48%), or 3) Pick at least one red marble in seven tries out 
of a bag of 90 white and 10 red marbles (i.e., a disjunctive event with an objective 
probability of 52%) Contrary to what the objective probabilities would dictate, Bar-Hillel 
found test subjects consistently chose the conjunctive events most often, simple events 
next, and disjunctive events least. (1973; as cited by Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Next, 
using the cognate, inertial ψ effect, Cohen, Chesnick, and Harlan (1972) found test subjects 
tended to “overestimate compound probabilities, in the rough sense that they think they 
have a better chance of success than is actually the case” (p. 41); and concluded that the 
mind’s grasp of compound probabilities is far from intuitive, which results in a predictable 
systemic error. Finally, Teigen, Martinussen, and Lund (1996) were able to replicate 
previous research findings relating to the conjunction bias, but concluded that while the 
conjunction bias was prevalent, it was not necessarily universal. Teigen et al. found that 
the severity of the conjunction bias varies based upon the “type of probability (fictional 
versus [real life events]), unequal versus equal probabilities of constituent [i.e., simple 
events making up the compound-conjunctive probability] events, predictions of positive 
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versus negative outcomes, and, for real-life predictions only, number of constituent events” 
(1996, p. 77). (See also Bazerman, 1990, 1998; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Yates, 1990) 
5. Conservatism 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the conservatism bias as follows: “Often estimates are 
not revised appropriately on the receipt of new significant data” (p. 9; see also Carter et al., 
2007, p. 637). Arnott elaborates further that this bias occurs when an individual resists or 
ignores new data or information in order to “protect the waste of the prior cognitive effort 
of making a decision” (1998, p. 9). Sage (1981) defines the conservatism bias as “the failure 
to revise estimates as much as they should be revised based on receipt of new significant 
information” (p. 3.15; see also Hogarth, 1987, p. 218). For example, a weapons program 
could suffer from this bias by failing to adequately revise budget and schedule estimates as 
new information regarding increased costs and schedule delays are received. This bias is 
irrational because the sunk costs of prior cognitive efforts or commitments should not 
preclude a rational analysis of new information. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the conservatism 
bias. Peterson, Schneider, and Miller (1965) found test subjects inadequately revised their 
previously assessed subjective probabilities when presented with additional statistical data 
(p. 523). Phillips and Edwards (1966) concluded “conservatism in the processing of 
probabilistic information appears to be a pervasive effect” (p. 353). Phillips, Hays & 
Edwards (1966) echoed this conclusion, and further speculated that conservatism in 
processing information was “the result of intellectual [cognitive], not motivational, 
deficiencies’ (p. 17). DuCharme (1970) found the probabilistic conservatism bias to be 
most prevalent when subjects were asked to assess subjective probabilities of large 
numbers (p. 74). Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) summarized “subjects’ confidence in 
the apparently correct hypothesis did not increase as quickly as the accumulating evidence 
indicated that it should” (p. 248).  
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6. Control 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the control bias (a.k.a. illusion of control) as follows: “A 
poor decision may lead to a good outcome inducing a false feeling of control over the 
judgement situation” (p. 9). According to Kahneman (2011), decision makers often 
underestimate the impact that chance has on events and outcomes (p.14). Arnott (1998) 
further elaborates that a control bias occurs when “subjective probabilities of an event are 
systematically assessed to be higher than the relevant objective probabilities” (p. 9), and 
can be triggered by rigorous planning or even thinking about an event. Using the cognate, 
illusion of control, Sage (1981) states: “A good outcome in a chance situation may well 
have resulted from a poor decision. The decisionmaker may assume a feeling of control 
over events that is not reasonable” (p. 3.17). The control bias is irrational because an 
individual’s degree of confidence in a probabilistic and/or chance event should not exceed 
the objective known probabilities of that event. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the control bias. In 
a series of studies, Langer (1975) found test participants exhibited the illusion of control 
bias, which Langer defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (p. 311). Langer 
found the illusion of control bias to be most prevalent in conditions where a chance task/
environment is similar to a skill task/environment; and can be exacerbated by increasing 
competition among participants, participant choice or involvement, or participants’ 
familiarity with the task (Langer, 1975). In a paper appropriately titled “Heads I Win, Tails 
It’s Chance…” (p. 951), Langer and Roth (1975) were able to induce the control bias with 
Yale University undergraduates tasked with predicting coin tosses. Koehler, Gibbs, and 
Hogarth (1994) found this bias to be significantly more prevalent in one-shot gambles 
versus long-run repeated-event experimental frameworks (p. 190; see also Budescu & 
Bruderman, 1995), which means that individuals are more susceptible to the control bias 
when they are faced with unique, low-frequency decision events. DOD weapons programs 
are likely to suffer from this bias because they deal with very unique decisions under 
uncertainty, face significant probabilistic/chance events (risk), require rigorous planning, 
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often compete with other programs for funding, and require decision makers to have a high 
level of involvement when making decisions.  
7. Desire 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the desire bias (a.k.a. wishful thinking, value bias, & 
outcome bias) as follows: “The probability of desired outcomes may be assessed to be 
greater than actually warrants” (p. 10; see also Schwenk, 1988, p. 44; Carter et al., 2007, 
p. 638). Success is often overestimated even though a decision maker may have access to 
information telling them otherwise (Arnott, 1998, 2006). Hogarth (1987) defines this bias 
as wishful thinking, stating “People’s preferences for outcomes of events affect their 
assessment of the events” (p. 221). In an analysis of 3,500 predictions made by 400 
subjects, Mcgregor (1938) found that subjects’ predictions were influenced by “the 
importance that the predictor attributes to the occurrence of the particular event (i.e., the 
degree to which he believes his own welfare, pride, or ideals will be affected by the event)” 
(p. 203; as cited in Olsen, 1997). Budescu and Bruderman (1995) found that test subjects 
consistently demonstrated an outcome desirability bias, with little variance between 
desired outcomes that were framed as gains or losses. Additionally, while they determined 
the presence of the desire bias to be highly correlated with the illusion of control (control) 
bias, they determined that the desire bias was still present in experiments designed to 
eliminate the influence of the control bias (p. 123). The desire bias is irrational because a 
decision maker’s desire for a specific outcome does not alter the objective probabilities 
associated with that outcome. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the desire bias. In 
two studies involving professionally certified investment managers from the U.S. and 
Taiwan, Olsen (1997) found these professionals demonstrated a statistically significant 
desirability bias when forecasting probabilities. Olsen’s findings indicate experts are 
susceptible to the desire bias, and therefore, it is likely that trained acquisition professionals 
could be subject to this bias as well. For example, if a weapons program experiences 
significant schedule delays, decision makers may allow production to begin concurrent 
with testing. Such a decision would likely have been influenced by the desire bias if 
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concurrent testing/production was not originally determined to be an advisable course of 
action. This is because the desire to catch-up the schedule should not subsequently alter 
the logic underlying the original decision.  
While the desire bias is considered by many researchers to be cognitive in nature, 
Montibeller and Winterfeldt (2015) classify it as a motivational bias. However, because 
most research into decision biases has focused on cognitive rather than motivational 
factors, there currently is no clear consensus regarding the role that motivational factors 
play in this bias (Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015, p. 1230). As detailed in Chapter I, for a 
bias where there is no clear consensus regarding whether a decision bias is purely cognitive, 
we have highlighted the ambiguity and recommend further study.  
8. Escalation 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the escalation bias (a.k.a. non rational escalation of 
commitment, commitment, & entrapment) as follows: “Often decision makers commit to 
follow or escalate a previous unsatisfactory course of action” (p. 11). Using the term, 
commitment, Carter et al. (2007) describes the phenomenon as follows: “Once decision 
makers make a commitment to a person or course of conduct, they may consistently adhere 
to that commitment eve if later confronted with facts suggesting that the commitment is a 
bad choice” (p. 636). Lastly, Drummond (1994) succinctly defines the escalation bias as 
“irrational persistence” (p. 51). This bias is commonly described as throwing good money 
after bad. Sunk costs such as time, money, or effort are the same whether or not you 
continue with the course of action, so these costs should be irrelevant to an assessment of 
a present decision (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984). However, decision makers often exhibit an 
irrational tendency to continue supporting a previous decision, even when the facts or data 
the decision was based on have changed. A weapons program could suffer from this bias 
if decision makers decide to continue with a program that—due to either changing 
requirements or performance shortfalls—is no longer expected to support the required 
warfighter capability. Unless the “costs of abandonment, or non-escalation, outweigh the 
benefits” (Arnott, 1998, p. 11), the escalation bias is considered irrational because sunk 
costs should not be a factor in deciding whether to continue with a course of action.  
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The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the escalation bias. 
Arnott (1998) describes the escalation bias as a meta-bias, where it is likely to result from 
a combination of the confirmation, adjustment, framing, and success cognitive biases; and 
motivational decision biases. Staw and Ross (1978) found that test subjects committed the 
most resources in a fictional scenario when their previous decision resulted in failure versus 
when their previous decision resulted in a positive outcome. They also found that test 
subjects committed the most resources when an exogenous (external) reason for the failure 
was presented to test subjects (Staw & Ross, 1978; see also Staw, 1976, 1981). Drummond 
(1994) states that “a major cause of escalation is thought to be information-processing bias 
[i.e., cognitive]” (p. 50). However, her study findings also speculated that other factors 
such social and political pressure, organizational culture, power dynamics, and visibility of 
actors may also cause escalation (Drummond, 1994). 
Beeler and Hunton (1997) found that test subject were more likely to exhibit the 
escalation bias when their original decision (i.e., allocations for a fictional stock portfolio) 
was announced publicly. They also found that those who were incentivized for their 
performance were more likely to exhibit the escalation bias than those that were paid a flat 
fee or not paid at all. Lastly, they found those that exhibited the escalation bias were more 
likely to increase their search for information supporting their prior decision (retrospective 
information), and were less likely to seek information about the decision at hand 
(prospective information) (Beeler & Hunton, 1997). (See also Brockner & Rubin, 1985; 
Schwenk, 1986; Teger, 1980). 
While the escalation bias is broadly considered to be cognitive in nature, Bazerman 
qualified that the escalation bias can be influenced by motivational factors to some extent 
(1990, 1998; as cited by Arnott, 1998). However, there currently is no clear consensus 
regarding the role that motivational factors play in this bias. As detailed in Chapter I, given 
the lack of consensus regarding whether this decision bias is purely cognitive, we have 
highlighted the ambiguity and recommend further study. 
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9. Hindsight 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the hindsight bias as follows: “In retrospect the degree 
to which an event would have been predicted is usually overestimated.” (p. 14; see also 
Hogarth, 1987, p. 222). This bias is most frequently aligned with the phrase “I knew it all 
along.” It is the inclination, after an event has occurred, to see the event as having been 
predictable when there has been little to no basis for predicting it. This is why stock market 
pundits are so adept at explaining the cause of market swings after-the-fact, but are poor at 
accurately predicting such movements beforehand. The hindsight bias results in more 
confident decision makers, but reduces these individuals’ ability to learn from past 
mistakes (Arnott, 1998). For example, a program manager could exhibit the hindsight bias 
if he/she evaluates poor outcomes from similar programs, and attributes these outcomes to 
obviously poor decisions that he/she would not have made under similar circumstances. 
The hindsight bias is an especially important cognitive bias for acquisition reformers to 
mitigate since acquisition reform efforts have failed to solve the same fundamental 
problems over the past 60 years (Fox, 2009, p. 35). In other words, if DOD acquisition 
reform efforts have failed to learn from the mistakes of the past time and time again, then 
the hindsight bias may something to do with it. Arnott (1998) also indicated that the 
hindsight bias is likely interrelated with the control bias and the overconfidence bias (See 
also Langer & Roth, 1975; Fischoff et al., 1977). The hindsight bias is irrational since 
knowledge of an outcome of an event should not affect the objective predictability of the 
event.  
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the hindsight bias. 
Fischhoff and Byeth (1975) found that judges presented with the outcome of an event were 
disproportionately confident in their ability to have predicted the event than judges who 
lacked knowledge of the outcome (See also Fischoff, 1982). Additionally, Fischoff (1977) 
found the hindsight bias to have a robust influence on subjects’ responses, even when 
subjects were explicitly warned about the influence of the hindsight bias. He concluded 
that the processes underlying the hindsight bias “are so natural and immediate that people 
don’t appreciate the effect that hearing the answer has had on their perceptions … Even 
when told to do so, it is evidently extremely difficult to de-process so important a bit of 
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information as the right answer” (Fischoff, 1977, p. 356). Next, Connolly and Bukszar 
(1990) tested whether the hindsight bias was driven by self-flattery (motivational) or 
cognitive error. They concluded that “cognitive factors are the primary cause of hindsight 
effects” (p. 209), and that “motivations such as self-flattery or self-presentation are not 
central to [inducing the hindsight bias]” (Connolly & Bukszar, 1990, p. 208). Next, Ofir & 
Mazursky (1997) concluded the following reaction framework for the hindsight bias: 
“When the outcome is relatively unsurprising, the ‘I knew it all along’ reaction is posited… 
Conversely, when the outcome is highly surprising, an ‘I could not have expected it’ 
reaction results” (p. 57; see also Mazursky and Ofir, 1997). Finally, in a statement that 
seems to have been written with defense acquisition participants in mind, Kahneman 
(2011) notes that “because adherence to standard operating procedures is difficult to 
second-guess, decision makers who expect to have their decisions scrutinized with 
hindsight are driven to bureaucratic solutions—and to an extreme reluctance to take risks”  
(pp. 204). (See also Buchman, 1985; Bazerman, 1990, 1998) 
10. Overconfidence 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the overconfidence bias (a.k.a. planning fallacy & 
Dunning-Kruger effect) as follows: “The ability to answer difficult or novel questions is 
often over-estimated” (p. 16). Kahneman (2011) defines a related phenomenon, the 
planning fallacy, as when plans and forecasts “are unrealistically close to best-case 
scenarios,” and “could be improved by consulting the statistics of similar cases” (p. 250). 
Referring to the phenomenon as the Dunning-Kruger effect, Dunning (2005) consistently 
found that research subjects deemed most incompetent in terms of skill or knowledge were 
the least aware of these shortcomings; and were most likely to overestimate their 
knowledge or ability. Sage (1981) states “People generally ascribe more credibility to data 
than is warranted and hence overestimate the probability of success merely due to the 
presence of an abundance of data. The greater the amount of data, the more confident the 
person is in the accuracy of the data” (p. 3.18; see also Carter et al., 2007, p. 640). For 
example, a weapons program could suffer from this bias if decision makers rely upon cost 
and schedule estimates that are based upon a best case scenario and/or fail to take into 
account historical cost/schedule overruns for similar programs. This bias is irrational since 
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the level of one’s confidence should take into account one’s lack of knowledge, data, or 
experience regarding a novel task or question, and actively seek disconfirming evidence 
rather than confirming evidence. 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the overconfidence 
bias. Oskamp (1965) evaluated a group of psychologists, and found that while their 
confidence level increased significantly as they received additional information about a 
case, there was not a correlating increase in the accuracy of their judgments. See also 
Howell’s (1972) findings, relating to the overconfidence bias, in the discussion of the 
success bias in this Sub-Section. After conducting a series of experiments, Fischhoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) concluded the following: “These five experiments have 
shown people to be wrong too often when they are certain that they are right” (p. 561). 
They found the overconfidence bias to be rather robust, arising in a variety of questions, 
study formats, and test subjects; and when subjects were incentivized with real money to 
be accurate (Fischhoff et al., 1977). Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) describe the 
confidence assessment task underlying the overconfidence bias as having two cognitive 
stages: 1) searching one’s knowledge for an answer, and 2) assessing one’s confidence in 
the correctness of that answer. Within these two stages, Koriat et al. (1980) found that 
subjects systematically favored “positive rather than negative evidence (i.e., reasons for 
over reasons against) (p. 116) in the first cognitive stage; and that subjects systematically 
“[disregarded] evidence inconsistent with (contradictory to) the chosen answer (p. 117). 
Koriat et al. (1980) suggested that the presence of this bias could be mitigated by reframing 
the instructions/questions to force test subjects to consider negative/contradictory 
evidence, which indicates a bias that is cognitive in nature. The overconfidence bias is 
likely interrelated with or the result of a combination of the anchoring and adjustment, 
confirmation, hindsight, recall, and similarity cognitive biases; and motivational biases 
(Russo & Schoemaker, 1992; as cited by Arnott, 1998). Kahneman (2011) also notes that 
the overconfidence bias “is fed by the illusory certainty of hindsight” (p. 14). 
While the overconfidence bias is broadly considered to be cognitive in nature, 
Montibeller and Winterfeldt (2015) classify it as a motivational bias. However, since most 
research into decision biases has focused on cognitive rather than motivational factors, there 
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currently is no clear consensus regarding the role that motivational factors play in this bias 
(Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015, p. 1230). As detailed in Chapter I, for a bias where there 
is no clear consensus regarding whether a decision bias is purely cognitive, we have 
highlighted the ambiguity and recommend further study.  
In terms of our research, the overconfidence bias is the 800-pound gorilla in the room. 
Based on our literature review and the results of our analysis, the overconfidence bias appears 
to most prevalently influence deviations from sound acquisition practices; but is the most 
complex in terms of its’ underlying psychological processes, and relation and/or similarity 
to other decision biases. Also, since there are compelling yet conflicting research findings 
relating to whether the overconfidence is a cognitive or a motivational decision bias, we 
speculate it likely results from a mixture of both cognitive and motivational factors.  
11. Reference 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the reference bias as follows: “The establishment of a 
reference point, or anchor can be a random or distorted act” (p. 17; see also Carter et al., 
2007, p. 641). According to Arnott, this bias is closely related to the anchoring and 
adjustment bias, but is associated with the selection of a poor reference point (anchor), rather 
than an insufficient adjustment from the anchor (1998; see also Arnott, 2006). In situations 
where there is uncertainty, people tend to make assessments by starting from a specific 
known reference point, and then adjusting that assessment appropriately. Sage (1981) states 
“People normally perceive and evaluate stimuli in accordance with their present and past 
experiential level for the stimuli. They sense a reference level in accordance with past 
experience” (p. 3.19). This approach requires the reference point to have a valid connection 
to the uncertainty. For instance, the Federal Government often uses historical pricing as a 
reference point when determining whether a proposed price is fair and reasonable. However, 
in longstanding sole-source procurement environments, using historical pricing as a 
reference point would likely result in an inaccurate Government estimate. If the 
establishment of a reference point is capricious or is somehow biased, judgements adjusting 
from this reference point will consequently be negatively affected (Arnott, 1998, 2006; Sage, 
1981; see also Bazerman, 1990, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Similar to the anchoring 
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and adjustment bias, while the use of anchors/reference points in making decisions under 
uncertainty is not inherently irrational, selecting invalid anchors/reference points that do not 
have a “valid connection to the uncertainty” (Sage, 1981, p. 3.19) is not rational. 
12. Selectivity 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the selectivity bias (a.k.a. selective perception & desire 
for self-fulfilling prophecies) as follows: “Expectation of the nature of an event can bias what 
information is thought relevant” (p. 20; see also Carter et al., 2007, p. 641). Sage (1981) 
describes a similar phenomenon, desire for self-fulfilling prophecies, as follows: “The 
decisionmaker values a certain outcome, interpretation, or conclusion and acquires and 
analyzes only information that supports this conclusion” (p. 3.16). Schwenk (1988) defines 
selective perception as follows: “Expectations may bias observations of variables relevant to 
strategy” (p. 44). Bruner and Postman (1949) found test subjects had difficulty correctly 
identifying playing cards that had been modified to be incongruous (ex. black three of hearts, 
red six of spades, black ace of diamonds, etc.) with the subjects’ expectations. Concluding 
that their test subjects’ propensity to draw broad conclusions from small sample sets was a 
cognitive bias rather than a motivational bias, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) state:  
The true believer in the law of small numbers commits his multitude of sins 
against the logic of statistical inference in good faith. The representation 
hypothesis describes a cognitive or perceptual bias, which operates regardless 
of motivational factors. … His intuitive expectations are governed by a 
consistent misperception of the world rather than by opportunistic wishful 
thinking. (p. 110) 
The selectivity bias is irrational because the systematic exclusion or omission of data/
information contrary to one’s expectations does not change reality. Rather, a rational 
statistical approach actively seeks disconfirming information to test a null hypothesis (See 
also Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the selectivity bias. 
Ariely (2010) demonstrated the influence of selective perception by offering college students 
a taste test and subsequent choice between two beers, a commercial brand and a craft brand 
that had been laced with balsamic vinegar. Ariely found students without knowledge of the 
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balsamic vinegar preferred the craft brand, but students that knew about the vinegar 
beforehand preferred the taste of the commercial brand. Ariely also found students that were 
told afterwards about the vinegar in their chosen beer still preferred their choice of beer, and 
in subsequent experiments, even added extra vinegar when given the opportunity (Ariely, 
2010, pp. 202–208). 
The selectivity bias can cause an individual to systematically exclude or dismiss 
opportunities, data, or feedback that does not fit the individual’s expected outcome. For 
example, if the Air Force is evaluating how a defense capability should be met, it is likely 
the Air Force would propose an aircraft solution. This propensity brings to mind the famous 
quote by Abraham Maslow (1966): “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a 
hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail” (pp. 15–16). Selective perception is especially 
problematic when individuals from several areas of expertise, departments, and/or 
backgrounds all work on the same problem, but approach the problem with widely differing 
selective perceptions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; see also Cyert, Dill, & March, 1958). 
Dearborn & Simon found that executives perceived “those aspects of a situation that relate 
specifically to and goals of his department” (1958, p. 142). A weapons program could suffer 
from this bias since numerous Defense Acquisition Communities of Practice (CoPs) such as 
Program Management, Auditing, Systems Engineering, Risk Management, Test and 
Evaluation, Contracting, etc., all have selective perceptions that are influenced by their own 
respective CoP’s values, best practices, culture, etc.  
13. Success 
Arnott (1998) summarizes the success bias (a.k.a. fundamental attribution error & 
success/failure attribution) as follows: “Often failure is associated with poor luck and success 
with the abilities of the decision maker” (p. 22; see also Carter et al., 2007, p. 642) (See also 
Sage, 1981, p. 3.17; Hogarth, 1987, p. 642). Arnott elaborates further that the success bias 
leads a decision maker to attribute successful outcomes to internal factors such as 
intelligence, decision making prowess, experience, etc.; but to attribute unsuccessful 
outcomes “to external factors such as unfair competition, weather, timing, and luck” (Arnott, 
1998, p. 22; see also Arnott, 2006). The success bias is closely associated with the 
overconfidence bias and the control bias (Arnott, 1998). However, Arnott differentiates 
between the success bias and the control bias, stating that the control bias arises in situations 
“where poor decision processes have a desirable outcome” (p. 22), whereas the success bias 
is “a common behaviour pattern of believing that successful decision outcomes are a result 
of the persons decision making prowess” (Arnott, 1998, p. 22). The success bias is 
irrational because the logical standards for attributing responsibility for an outcome should 
remain the same, regardless of the subject under scrutiny or whether the outcome was 
positive or negative.  
The following is a selection of relevant research associated with the success bias. 
Howell (1972) concluded that, when dealing with “uncertainty arising from their own 
behavior (internal or skill-derived uncertainty), [test subjects] showed a consistent tendency 
toward overconfidence” (p. 6; see also Langer & Roth, 1975). Howell found this tendency 
towards internal overconfidence to be generalizable since it has been confirmed under a 
broad range of experimental conditions, and for “several very different kinds of behavior” 
(p. 6). Howell found test subjects were more likely to overestimate unpredictable events that 
were dependent on the subjects’ skill (i.e., dart throwing) versus events that were more 
obviously out of the subjects’ control (i.e., spinning a roulette wheel) (Howell, 1972; see also 
Ross, 1977). These findings indicate that when decision makers perceive uncertain events to 
be within their control or largely affected by expertise/skill, they are systematically biased 
towards being overconfident in their assessments of positive outcomes. Additionally, when 
confronted with a poor outcome, a decision maker is likely to attribute the outcome to 
external factors outside his/her control.  
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) described what they termed as test subjects’ “illusion of 
introspective awareness.” They concluded that after-the-fact, 1) people have significant 
difficulty assessing why they made a decision, and what internal and external stimuli affected 
their decision; 2) people may not “interrogate a memory of the cognitive processes that 
operated on the stimuli” (p. 233), but rather rely upon priori causal theories (pre-established 
mental models of cause and effect); and 3) instances where subjects accurately assess higher 
mental processes are “due to the incidentally correct employment of a priori causal theories” 
(p. 233). In other words, we are poorly equipped to recognize after-the-fact what factors 
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influenced our decisions, and/or whether decisions were based upon an intuitive (System 1) 
or a logical/rational (System 2) type process. We are likely unaware of our unawareness. Our 
memories are not videotapes or transcripts that can be objectively analyzed, but rather are 
impressions and perceptions that can shift based upon the outcomes of our decisions (Heuer, 
1999). The illusion of introspective awareness is a psychological phenomenon that likely 
plays a significant role in the control bias and the success bias, and indicates that these biases 
are likely cognitive in nature rather than motivational.  
However, while Miller (1976) corroborated the existence of the success bias in his 
study, he proposed that his findings indicate that ego and self-serving motivational factors, 
rather than cognitive factors, were largely responsible for the success bias, but indicated that 
further study is needed to confirm this. As detailed in the preceding discussion, while the 
success bias is broadly considered to be cognitive in nature, there currently is not a clear 
consensus for this conclusion (Miller, 1976; see also Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015, p. 
1233). As detailed in Chapter I, for a bias where there is no clear consensus regarding 
whether a decision bias is purely cognitive, we have highlighted the ambiguity and 
recommend further study.  
E. MOTIVATIONAL DECISION BIASES 
This section will provide an overview of two motivational decision biases we 
encountered most prevalently in our analysis. For each bias, we provide a brief summary of 
the bias; an example of how the bias could manifest in a DOD weapon system acquisition 
environment; and a selection of relevant research (if any), along with any situational 
indicators and/or conditions where the bias is likely to occur. However, considering the 
limited scope of this research, the discussion of each bias is limited to a general overview in 
order to provide the reader with a foundation for the discussion of our findings.  
1. Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals 
Lovallo and Sibony (2010) define “Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” bias 
(a.k.a. principal-agent problem) as follows: “Disagreements (often unspoken) about the 
hierarchy or relative weight of objectives pursued by the organization and about the tradeoffs 
between them” (p. 15). This bias represents the self-interested motivations that sub-groups 
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within an organization may exhibit when their interests conflict with the overarching 
organization. In the context of the defense acquisition environment, what is good for the 
Government as a whole might not be considered to be a benefit to a particular agency or 
weapons program. For example, although the Government benefits from cutting wasteful 
spending and/or reallocating funds to programs deemed to be the highest priority, a program 
manager might decide to use up funds as quickly as possible to avoid budget reallocations 
and/or budget cuts. GAO’s (1992) description of parochialism falls within this category of 
motivational biases. Individual service branches exhibit parochialism by developing 
requirements and narrowly considering alternatives which favor developing weapons within 
the individual branch’s area of responsibility (GAO, 1992, p. 41). Lovallo and Sibony (2010) 
offer an intuitive argument for the existence of this motivational bias, but offer no empirical 
evidence or studies to support their assertion. This lack of supporting empirical research is 
consistent with Montibeller and Winterfeldt’s (2015) assertion that most research into 
decision biases has focused on cognitive rather than motivational decision biases (p. 1230).  
2. Strategic Misrepresentation 
Jones and Euske (1991) define strategic misrepresentation as the “planned, 
systematic distortion or misstatement of fact—lying— in response to incentives” (p. 437). 
This bias results in an organization knowingly understating costs and overstating benefits. 
Our original DBD did not include strategic misrepresentation, but was added later to better 
define the incentive-driven behaviors found in our third case study. While strategic 
misrepresentation is a conscious decision rather than a cognitive or motivational bias, we 
included it as a motivational bias within our analysis since the behavior is incentive-driven. 
Although strategic misrepresentation and the overconfidence bias are often closely 
associated with each other (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2005), strategic 
misrepresentation is differentiated by purposeful and calculated statements and/or omissions 
that result in misrepresentations of fact to a decision maker. According to Jones and Euske 
(1991), strategic misrepresentation is a result of intentional planning with the goal of 
maximizing benefits within a system of “controlled competition for limited resources” (p. 
438). Acquisition participants guilty of this bias would justify it as an expected part of the 
negotiation and argue that many worthwhile projects would never get approved if the true 
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costs were revealed at the start. Finally, while GAO (1992) stops short of stating these 
behaviors are intentional, the report comes very close to describing this bias: 
The desire of program sponsors to keep cost estimates as low as possible and 
to present attractive milestone schedules has encouraged the use of 
unreasonable assumptions about the pace and magnitude of the technical 
effort, material costs, production rates, savings from competition, and other 
factors. (p. 21) 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed the relevant literature we reviewed in order to inform our overall 
analysis, review various decision bias taxonomies necessary to develop our DBD, identify 
common types of decision biases, and review the literature supporting GAO’s incentives 
narrative. Next, Chapter III details the analysis methodologies and data used to answer our 
primary and secondary research questions, which ultimately enabled us to achieve our 
primary and secondary research objectives. 
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter II details the literature review we performed to inform our analysis and to 
develop our DBD. This chapter details our analysis methodologies and data. Section A 
summarizes the analysis methodologies and data we used to answer the primary and 
secondary research questions associated with our primary research objective. Section B 
summarizes the analysis methodologies and data we used to answer the primary and 
secondary research questions associated with our secondary research objective. Each 
section explains how the research questions were answered, to include what data was 
needed, how the data was obtained, and what analysis methodologies were utilized to 
answer each respective question. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
To determine whether it is likely that cognitive decision biases significantly 
contribute to deviations from sound acquisition practices, we evaluated a selection of case 
studies to determine which (if any) decision biases were likely to have contributed to 
deviations from sound acquisition practices. To do this, we first compiled a decision bias 
dictionary (DBD) of well-established cognitive and motivational decision biases, and then 
used the DBD to code a selection of GAO report transcripts. This section summarizes our 
analysis methodology and data used to answer these questions.  
1. Decision Bias Dictionary 
Prior to conducting our analysis, it was necessary to compile a customized DBD of 
well-established cognitive and motivational decision biases. As introduced in Chapter I 
and detailed in Chapter II, we ultimately assembled a customized DBD consisting 44 
individual biases, divided into 8 bias categories. The dictionary included columns for each 
bias category, bias name, bias code, bias definition, notes regarding situational indicators 
and conditions where the bias is likely to occur, and cognates (synonymous, similar, or 
related decision biases). The information contained within the dictionary was adapted and/
or incorporated verbatim from the decision bias taxonomies detailed in Chapter II (See 
Arnott, 1998, 2006; Lovallo and Sibony, 2010; Jones & Euske, 1991).  
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After deciding on the source taxonomies and biases, we assigned unique codes for 
each bias and category; reviewed and discussed taxonomy descriptions for each decision 
bias; and added notes within the DBD regarding situational indicators and conditions where 
certain biases were likely to occur. We began by assigning unique codes for each of the 
bias categories and individual decision biases listed within the DBD, to allow for efficient 
coding of our transcripts. Next, to confirm our joint understanding of the DBD, we 
reviewed and discussed each decision bias within our DBD, including descriptions, 
examples, cognates, and similar biases within the DBD. We also reviewed the original 
taxonomies for more detailed information regarding each decision bias, to include in-depth 
descriptions, examples, cognates, and empirical studies referenced. Informed by this 
review, we added notes within the DBD regarding situational indicators and conditions 
where certain biases were likely to occur.  
We discussed whether each decision bias was determined by the source taxonomies 
to be a cognitive or motivational bias, and indicated this assessment within our DBD as 
follows: “C” (cognitive) or “M” (Motivational). However, while the “Confirmation,” 
“Desire,” “Escalation,” “Overconfidence,” and “Success” biases are categorized as 
cognitive biases by many researchers/taxonomies and our source taxonomy; we noted there 
is currently a lack of clear consensus among researchers regarding whether these biases are 
purely cognitive, purely motivational, or a mixture of two. In these instances, we noted the 
ambiguity but did not come to a definitive assessment, indicating the ambiguity within our 
DBD as follows: “C or M”. 
Table 2 is a condensed version (columns B, C, & E) of our DBD, including all 44 
individual biases, and 8 bias categories used for our analysis. 
  
65 
Table 2. Combined Table of Selected Decision Bias Taxonomies 
BIAS CODE BIAS DESCRIPTION 
ADJUSTMENT BIAS CATEGORY* 
Anchoring and 
Adjustment* Adj-1 
Adjustments from an initial position are usually 
insufficient 
Conservatism* Adj-2 Often estimates are not revised appropriately on the receipt of significant new data 
Reference* Adj-3 The establishment of a reference point or anchor can be a random or distorted act 
Regression* Adj-4 That events will tend to regress towards the mean on subsequent trials is often not allowed for in judgement 
CONFIDENCE CATEGORY* 
Completeness* Con-1 The perception of an apparently complete or logical data presentation can stop the search for omissions 
Confirmation* Con-2 Often decision-makers seek confirmatory evidence and do not search for disconfirming information 
Control* Con-3 
A poor decision may lead to a good outcome, inducing a 
false feeling of control over the judgement situation. 
Arises when subjective probabilities of an event are 
systematically assessed to be higher than the relevant 
objective probabilities. Rigorous planning can also 
induce the bias 
Desire* Con-4 The probability of desired outcomes may be inaccurately assessed as being greater 
Overconfidence* Con-5 The ability to solve difficult or novel problems is often overestimated 
Redundancy* Con-6 
The more redundant and voluminous the data, the more 
confidence may be expressed in its accuracy and 
importance 
Selectivity* Con-7 Expectation of the nature of an event can bias what information is thought to be relevant 
Success* Con-8 Often failure is associated with poor luck, and success with the abilities of the decision-maker 
Test* Con-9 Some aspects and outcomes of choice cannot be tested, leading to unrealistic confidence in judgement 
66 
BIAS CODE BIAS DESCRIPTION 
INTEREST BIAS CATEGORY* 
Misaligned Individual 
Incentives** Int-1 
Tendency to genuinely (not cynically) hold views or 
seek outcomes favorable to oneself or one’s unit at the 
expense of the overall interest of the company. 
Inappropriate 
Attachments** Int-2 
Tendency to create emotional attachments to people or 
elements of the business resulting in misalignment of 
interests. 
Misaligned Perception 
Of Corporate Goals** Int-3 
Tendency of people to hold conflicting perceptions 
(often unspoken) about hierarchy or relative weight of 




A planned, systematic distortion or misstatement of fact 
(lying) in response to incentives  
MEMORY BIAS CATEGORY* 
Hindsight* Mem-1 In retrospect, the degree to which an event could have been predicted is often overestimated 
Imaginability* Mem-2 An event may be judged more probable if it can be easily imagined 
Recall* Mem-3 
An event or class may appear more numerous or 
frequent if its instances are more easily recalled than 
other equally probable events 
Search* Mem-4 An event may seem more frequent because of the effectiveness of the search strategy 
Similarity* Mem-5 
The likelihood of an event occurring may be judged by 
the degree of similarity with the class it is perceived to 
belong to 
Testimony* Mem-6 The inability to recall details of an event may lead to seemingly logical reconstructions that may be inaccurate 
PRESENTATION BIAS CATEGORY* 
Framing* Pres-1 Events framed as either losses or gains may be evaluated differently 
Linear* Pres-2 Decision-makers are often unable to extrapolate a nonlinear growth process 
Mode* Pres-3 The mode and mixture of presentation can influence the perceived value of data 
Order* Pres-4 The first or last item presented may be over weighted in judgement 
Scale* Pres-5 The perceived variability of data can be affected by the scale of the data 
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BIAS CODE BIAS DESCRIPTION 
SITUATION BIAS CATEGORY* 
Attenuation* Si-1 
A decision-making situation can be simplified by 
ignoring or significantly discounting the level of 
uncertainty 
Complexity* Si-2 
Time pressure, information overload, and other 
environmental factors can increase the perceived 
complexity of a task 
Escalation* Si-3 Often decision-makers commit to follow or escalate a previous unsatisfactory course of action 
Habit* Si-4 An alternative may be chosen only because it was used before 
Inconsistency* Si-5 Often a consistent judgement strategy is not applied to an identical repetitive set of cases 
Rule* Si-6 The wrong decision rule may be used 
SOCIAL BIAS CATEGORY 
Groupthink** Soc-1 Tendency to strive for consensus at the cost of a realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. 
Sunflower 
Management** Soc-2 
Tendency for groups to align with the views of their 
leaders, whether expressed or assumed. 
STATISTICAL BIAS CATEGORY* 
Base rate* Stat-1 Base rate data tends to be ignored when other data are available 
Chance* Stat-2 A sequence of random events can be mistaken for an essential characteristic of a process 
Conjunction* Stat-3 Probability is often overestimated in compound conjunctive problems 
Correlation* Stat-4 The probability of two events occurring together can be overestimated if they have co-occurred in the past 
Disjunction* Stat-5 Probability is often underestimated in compound disjunctive problems 
Sample* Stat-6 The size of a sample is often ignored in judging its predictive power 
Subset* Stat-7 A conjunction or subset is often judged more probable than its set 
*Adapted from Arnott (2006, pp. 60–61) 
** Adapted from Lovallo and Sibony (2010, p. 15) 
***Adapted from Jones and Euske (1991, p. 1).) 
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2. Transcript Coding Methodology 
First, we reviewed the case study to identify deviations from sound acquisition 
practices and/or a normative principle, or identify a situation/decision that was likely 
susceptible to decision biases. Once identified, these passages were highlighted for further 
review for evidence of a decision bias. Since we used GAO reports on Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) as our case study transcripts, we often had very specific 
assessments from GAO regarding whether some decisions were considered to deviate from 
sound acquisition practices. We also reviewed the case to identify situations/decisions that 
were considered susceptible to decision biases. We identified these by referring to the 
definitions and situational indicators within our DBD. We also examined any charts or 
graphs within the case study to identify any situational indicators for decision biases, 
especially presentation biases. For instance, we might assess the “Framing” bias if the 
information displayed could be framed as either a gain or a loss.  
Second, we examined the highlighted passages to assess which (if any) decision 
bias could have influenced the decision/situation, and we assigned one or more bias codes. 
For instances where the DBD’s concise definitions were insufficient to make an 
assessment, we referred back to the expanded bias descriptions within the source 
taxonomy. Since some decision biases within our DBD have overlapping definitions and 
shared effects, as detailed in Chapter II, we sometimes had to choose which decision bias 
best fit the situation. However, in every such instance, the choice was between two similar 
cognitive biases. There were numerous passages where we identified more than one 
possible decision bias for the same situation/decision, but this does not mean that all or 
even any of the assessed biases influenced the decision. Since it was impossible to 
definitively confirm which decision bias influenced a decision; we assessed which bias(es) 
were most likely to have influenced the decision, and/or which bias(es) the decision was 
most susceptible to, based on the context of the situation/decision. This approach is 
supported by Heuer (1999), who states “When psychological experiments reveal the 
existence of a bias, this does not mean that every judgement by every individual person 
will be biased. It means that in any group of people, the bias will exist to a greater or lesser 
degree in most judgements made by most of the group” (p. 112). Therefore, our goal was 
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to come to a reasonable subjective assessment of what types of decision biases were likely 
to have influenced the decision, viewing the passage through the lens of the HBP 
perspective rather than RCM perspective.  
3. Case Study Sources and Selection Considerations 
GAO reports were chosen as the data source for case study transcripts for several 
reasons. First, reviewing GAO reports provided an excellent contrast between GAO’s 
incentives-based perspective and the HBP perspective to assess deviations from sound 
acquisition practices. Next, GAO is widely considered to be a respected and objective 
authority with regard to assessing DOD acquisition programs, using consistent research 
methodologies and practices. Additionally, since GAO is used extensively by Congress to 
provide assessments/recommendations regarding DOD acquisition programs, GAO reports 
provide a consistently high level of accuracy and access to pertinent information/data. 
Finally, reviewing GAO report transcripts allowed us to apply a consistent normative 
standard (i.e. KBA approach) for identifying deviations from sound acquisition practices 
in our analysis. This consistency allowed us to rely upon GAO’s assessments regarding 
whether decisions identified within each case study were identified as deviations from 
sound acquisition practices. However, as detailed in Chapter I, we did view these 
assessments in light of the DOD and/or Agency responses to GAO’s findings included at 
the end of each report.  
We reviewed several GAO MDAP reports as potential candidates for our analysis. 
Our review considered a wide range of GAO reports on DOD MDAPs, to include joint 
programs and Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force programs in various stages of the 
acquisition cycle. We considered programs with positive and/or negative acquisition 
outcomes, but we did not select case studies with the goal of determining the relative 
influence or impact of assessed decision biases on acquisition outcomes. Our analysis 
focused on identifying decision biases associated with deviations from sound acquisition 
practices, regardless of acquisition outcomes. Accordingly, we specifically selected reports 
where GAO identified multiple deviations from sound acquisition practices, and where 
GAO provided detailed background/context into the decisions underlying these deviations. 
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We chose GAO reports on the Navy’s Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier and Littoral Combat 
Ship and Frigate (LCS) programs because GAO has specifically cited the incentives 
narrative to explain poor acquisition outcomes within these programs (GAO, 2015c; GAO, 
2016b). We chose to review these two cases to provides a unique contrast between GAO’s 
incentives-based perspective and the HBP perspective. Finally, while we preferred reports 
that were relatively recent, we selected older GAO reports where GAO provided greater 
detail/context into identified deviations from sound acquisition practices. Based on the 
above criteria, two Navy programs, one Marine program, one Air Force program, and one 
joint program were ultimately selected for analysis, and are detailed as follows: 
(1) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Frigate (GAO, 2016b)  
(2) Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) (GAO, 2018b) 
(3) Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier, CVN 78 (GAO, 2017b) 
(4) F-22A (GAO, 2012a) 
(5) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (GAO, 2009) 
4. Analysis  
During the analysis phase, two people independently coded our initial transcripts 
and validated/updated our coding methodologies and DBD accordingly, coded the 
remaining transcripts, and compiled/analyzed our findings.  
First, in order to validate the efficacy of the DBD and the precision of both 
transcript coders, we coded our first three case studies independently. Each reviewer 
separately highlighted passages within the transcript that indicated a deviation from sound 
acquisition practices. Next, using the comments feature within the PDF software, each 
reviewer inserted the assessed decision bias code, and in some cases, additional notes 
regarding the reviewer’s rationale. After each of the three initial cases, we compared our 
results, assessed the root cause(s) of any coding discrepancies (if any), and revised our 
transcript coding methodologies and DBD accordingly. We also reviewed our assessed 
decision biases to ensure we did not double count biases where the same event/decision 
was discussed in multiple passages. In most instances, both reviewers highlighted the same 
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passages indicating a deviation from sound acquisition practices. In the few instance where 
one of the reviewers highlighted a specific passage and the other did not, we discussed each 
other’s rationale and agreed whether the passage in question would remain as part of the 
overall analysis. Coding assignments by each of the reviewers were also discussed. While 
the majority of independent coding assignments were identical, some differed due to 
individual interpretations of the text presented in the transcript. In such cases, both 
viewpoints were discussed, notations were made in those passages, and a final coding 
assignment was agreed upon. These discussions aided both reviewers in gaining a better 
understanding of the DBD’s biases descriptions, and to improve the DBD itself. These 
discussions also enabled us to establish consistent coding assignments for commonly cited 
decisions and/or situations encountered within and/or among the assessed case studies.  
After completing this process, we calculated our inter-rater reliability to determine 
the reliability of our rating scheme and methodologies. To do this, we evaluated the 
variances between our independent coding decisions for our third case study, Ford-Class 
Aircraft Carrier, CVN 78. We found that out of 133 separate instances, our independent 
assessments varied only 10 times (7.52%). This figure includes situations where either one 
of us assessed a bias for a decision/situation where the other one did not, or we had different 
assessed biases for the same decision/situation. Therefore, our validation efforts for the 
CVN 78 case resulted in an overall rater-reliability percentage of 92.48%. 
After reviewing and validating our results for the first three cases, we determined 
that two additional case studies would be more than sufficient to provide an illustrative 
view of the HBP perspective. Subsequently, one reviewer coded the remaining two 
transcripts, and compiled our combined findings into a spreadsheet. In Chapter IV, we 
present a table of assessed biases for our overall analysis and within the discussion of each 
case study’s findings. These tables list each assessed bias by frequency of occurrence, but 
are not presented as a definitive/comprehensive ranking. Additionally, because the 
assessed case study transcripts varied significantly in length, the overall number of assessed 
biases was not necessarily indicative of the program’s susceptibility to decision biases. In 
addition to noting the frequency and distribution of the assessed decision biases, we also 
sought to make tentative conclusions regarding specific circumstances (e.g., concurrency 
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strategies) and common themes we encountered within and among the assessed case 
studies. Finally, based upon the results of our analysis and literature review, we made 
conclusions and recommendations, as detailed in the Chapter V. 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
In order to achieve our secondary research objective, we needed to assess whether 
GAO’s incentives narrative was well-founded and conclusive (primary research question 
1b). To do this, we reviewed relevant GAO reports and major acquisition reform studies’ 
findings concerning defense acquisition culture and incentives to examine the fundamental 
assumptions, historical development, and empirical research/critical reviews supporting 
GAO’s incentives narrative (secondary research question 2b). This literature review is 
detailed in Chapter II, and our findings are detailed in Chapter IV.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed the analysis methodologies and data used to answer our 
primary and secondary research questions, which ultimately enabled us to achieve our 
primary and secondary research objectives. Next, Chapter IV discusses our findings and 






In this chapter, we present the results of our analysis, which strongly support our 
expectation that both cognitive and motivational decision biases are likely to have 
contributed to deviations from sound acquisition practices in the coded case studies. First, 
we present our primary research objective findings, starting with a summary of results for 
our overall analysis. Next, we detail our findings for each case study; including a case 
overview, a table of assessed biases, examples and discussions of a selection of assessed 
biases, and figures and charts depicting our findings. Lastly, we present our findings related 
to our secondary research objective. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section will present a summary of results for our overall analysis, followed by 
a summary of results for each individual case study. An overview of each case study is 
provided to support the discussion of the selected examples for each case study. Each case 
study includes a discussion of a selection of assessed individual biases and/or groupings of 
decision biases encountered within our analysis. This discussion includes the percentage 
of passages where the bias cited, at least one example passage where the bias was assessed, 
and the rationale for our assessment. Also, if applicable, we identify any other unique 
circumstances/considerations and/or common themes associated with the identified bias. 
Lastly, some of the assessed biases are presented as a group of biases because they share 
the same example cited passage and/or they share a common theme in the context of the 
case study. However, these bias groupings are coincidental, and do not necessarily reflect 
a fundamental linkage or consistent co-occurrence within our findings. Our overall analysis 
summary and each case study summary includes figures and charts that graphically 
represent our findings.  
Our overall analysis identified 347 discrete instances where a decision bias was 
evident. Table 3 provides a summary of the coded decision biases, which are ranked based 
on number of occurrences. Figure 4 depicts the percentage that each bias category was 
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represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within the pie chart 
is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in Chapter III. 
Table 3. Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code Number of Occurrences 
Attenuation Si-1 51 
Overconfidence Con-5 42 
Hindsight  Mem-1 28 
Anchoring/Adjustment Adj-1 25 
Control Con-3 25 
Conjunction Stat-3 25 
Misaligned Corp Goals Int-3 18 
Escalation Si-3 16 
Conservatism Adj-2 14 
Complexity Si-2 14 
Desire Con-4 10 
Selectivity Con-7 10 
Reference Adj-3 9 
Strat Misrepresentation Int-4 7 
Success Con-8 6 
Completeness Con-1 5 
Confirmation Con-2 5 
Test Con-9 5 
Framing Pres-1 5 
Disjunction Stat-5 5 
Habit Si-4 4 
Regression Adj-4 3 
Imaginability Mem-2 2 
Scale Pres-5 2 
Rule Si-6 2 
Base rate Stat-1 2 
Correlation Stat-4 2 
Inappropriate Attachments Int-2 1 
Similarity Mem-5 1 
Linear Pres-2 1 
Inconsistency Si-5 1 
Chance Stat-2 1 
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Figure 4. Categories of Identified Decision Biases  
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Figure 5 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed for the 
overall analysis. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
 
Figure 5. Assessed Decision Biases  
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Figure 6 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
 
Figure 6. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization—Total Analysis 
1. Primary Research Findings: Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate (GAO, 
2016b) 
a. Case Overview 
The Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate (LCS) program has been the subject of 
numerous GAO reports since its inception. A synopsis of many of these reports were 
included in testimony presented before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate by 
Paul L. Francis (Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management) of GAO. 
The testimony transcript, delivered 1 Dec 2016, covered the LCS program’s acquisition 
history, business case, key risks in the Navy’s plans for program, and remaining oversight 
opportunities in the face of pending critical acquisition decisions. The ship designs were 
originally “two different prototype ships adapted from commercial designs” (Highlights 
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Page), identified as the Freedom and Independence variants (a.k.a. seaframes). The ships, 
once built, were originally planned to be sea tested in order to determine the final design. 
However, GAO noted that these initial plans “were abandoned early in favor of an 
acquisition approach that committed to [procuring] numerous ships before proving their 
capabilities” (Highlights Page); and cautioned that “making these commitments now could 
make it more difficult to make decisions in the future to reduce or delay the program should 
that be warranted” (Highlights Page). GAO also detailed how persistent problems with 
corrosion, propulsion systems, and the Mission Modules (Mine Countermeasures [MCMs], 
surface warfare [SUW], and antisubmarine warfare [ASW]) had resulted in large overall 
program cost overruns, significant schedule delays, ships delivered without contracted 
capabilities, and a significant reduction in the number of ships originally planned for 
procurement (GAO, 2016b). GAO also found the Navy’s vision for LCS had changed 
significantly. The original program quantity had taken a sharp decrease from 55 to 40 
seaframes. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) slipped from the original date of 2007 to 
only partial capabilities delivered in 2013. The Freedom variant could meet sprint speed, 
but not the range parameters; and the Independent variant did not meet sprint speed, but 
met the range parameters. While the program initially called for an IOC of the three 
Mission Modules by 2010; only one of the modules had met IOC in 2015, with the 
remaining two planned for 2020, but with a lowered level of performance (GAO, 2016b). 
b. Findings 
Our analysis of the LCS case identified 54 discrete instances where a decision bias 
was evident. Table 4 summarizes the coded decision biases, which are ranked based on 
number of occurrences. Figure 7 depicts the percentage that each bias category was 
represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within the pie chart 
is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in Chapter III. 
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Table 4. LCS Case—Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code Number of Occurrences 
Overconfidence Con-5 8 
Attenuation Si-1 8 
Misaligned Perception of 
Corporate Goals 
Int-3 5 
Hindsight Mem-1 4 
Conjunction Stat-3 3 
Regression Adj-4 3 
Complexity Si-2 3 
Escalation Si-3 3 
Habit Si-4 3 
Rule Si-6 2 
Confirmation Con-2 2 
Anchoring and Adjustment Adj-1 2 
Reference Adj-3 1 
Conservatism Adj-2 1 
Control Con-3 1 
Selectivity Con-7 1 
Test Con-9 1 
Strategic Misrepresentation Int-4 1 
Framing Pres-1 1 
Base Rate Stat-1 1 
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Figure 7. Categories of Identified Decision Biases—LCS Case  
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Figure 8 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed within the 
case study. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
 
Figure 8. Assessed Decision Biases—LCS Case 
The following individual biases or groupings of biases are highlighted and 
discussed in greater detail because they appear prevalently in our analysis and/or provide 
a unique illustrative view from an HBP perspective: 
(1) Overconfidence (Con-5) and Attenuation (Si-1) 
The “Overconfidence” bias was assessed in 30% of the passages cited within the 
case study. The “Attenuation” bias was also assessed in 30% of the passages cited within 
the case study. The following is an example of a passage where we assessed these two 
biases:  
To execute the program, the Navy deviated from traditional shipbuilding 
acquisition in hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. The 
consequences of this approach are well known today—costs to construct the 
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ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, with promised 
levels of capability unfulfilled and deliveries significantly delayed. (GAO, 
2016b, p. 1) 
We assessed the “Overconfidence” bias for this passage because it appears the 
Navy likely underestimated the difficulty of rapidly delivering ships while deviating from 
traditional shipbuilding methods. Additionally, by deviating from traditional acquisition 
methods, the Navy decision makers were likely at a disadvantage with regards to their level 
of experience (i.e., skill or knowledge) with estimating acquisition outcomes using this 
novel technique, which is a situational indicator for the overconfidence bias (i.e., the 
Dunning-Kruger effect). We assessed the “Attenuation” bias for this passage because the 
Navy’s decision likely involved “ignoring or significantly discounting the level of 
uncertainty” (Arnott, 1998, p.5) associated with adapting commercial designs to military 
specifications.  
Finally, there were numerous instances where the “Overconfidence” and 
“Attenuation” biases (along with other biases) were assessed in relation to concurrency 
issues. We go into greater depth regarding concurrency in our third case, but GAO (2016b) 
provides a good example of concurrency in the LCS case: “In an effort to achieve its goals, 
the Navy deviated from sound business practices by concurrently designing and 
constructing the two lead ship variants while still determining the ship’s requirements” (p. 
4). While a concurrency strategy may be appropriate under exceptional and/or very unique 
circumstances, GAO found this practice to be prevalent among large defense acquisition 
programs, usually resulting in poor acquisition outcomes (GAO, 1990; GAO, 2012b). The 
need to make up for lost ground (typically schedule) does not subsequently alter the 
business case/logic underlying the original decision.  
(2) Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals (Int-3) 
The “Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” bias was assessed in 19% of the 
passages cited within the case study. The following are two examples of passages where 
we assessed this bias:  
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Making these commitments now could make it more difficult to make 
decisions in the future to reduce or delay the program should that be 
warranted. (GAO, 2016b, Highlights Page) 
GAO has reported extensively about what we refer to as the defense 
acquisition culture, a prevailing set of incentives that encourages decisions 
to go forward with programs before they are ready and a willingness to 
accept cost growth and schedule delays as the likely byproduct of such 
decisions. (GAO, 2016b, p. 16) 
We assessed the “Misaligned Perception of Corporate Goals” bias for these 
passages because GAO implies and explicitly states that program participants were 
incentivized to view poor acquisition outcomes as a necessary tradeoff in pursuit of their 
own conflicting objectives (i.e., the program’s continued existence). In the first passage, 
GAO highlights how the decision advocated by the program (i.e., committing to a block 
buy) conflicted with the Government’s ability to make future decisions that would 
negatively impact the program. While Lovallo and Sibony’s (2010) description of this bias 
speaks in terms of a company, this bias description can be adapted to hexarchies within 
defense acquisition. For instance, what is good for the Government as a whole, may not be 
perceived as in the best interest of an agency or program. This bias is closely aligned with 
GAO’s incentives narrative. Lastly, we also assessed the “Overconfidence” bias for the 
first cited passage. This illustrates, from an HBP perspective, the ambiguity regarding the 
mix of cognitive and motivational factors that could have influenced the decision. We 
consider the existence/influence of these biases to both be plausible. 
(3) Escalation (Si-3) 
The “Escalation” bias was assessed in 11% of the passages cited within the case 
study. The following are example passages where we assessed this bias:  
A more basic oversight question today is whether a ship that costs twice as 
much yet delivers less capability than planned warrants an additional 
investment of nearly $14 billion. (GAO, 2016b, Highlights Page) 
Business case aside, the LCS program deviated from initial expectations, 
while continuing to commit to ship and mission package purchases. (GAO, 
2016b, p. 4) 
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We assessed the “Escalation” bias for these passages since they either demonstrate a past 
propensity for programmatic escalation in terms of cost, schedule, or reduced capabilities; 
and/or a risk of further escalation (i.e., investing an additional $14B). In the cited passages 
and throughout the case study, GAO indicates that the current program has strayed far from 
the merits of its original business case. This indicates an escalation of commitment by 
attempting to salvage sunk costs. We suspect the escalation bias likely has an influence on 
decision makers within a program and those tasked with approving additional funding, 
schedule delays, reduced capabilities, etc., in the face of poor acquisition outcomes (i.e., 
the Milestone Decision Authority and Congress). While conducting our literature review, 
we noted numerous other GAO and acquisition reform studies/reports that indicate a 
widespread tendency for MDAPs to be susceptible to the influence of this bias. Therefore, 
we speculate that further study and interventions to mitigate this bias across defense 
acquisition programs are likely to yield significant positive results. Finally, our literature 
review and findings indicate the “Escalation” bias is likely to be present in situations where 
there are significant initial outlays and/or commitments (e.g., block buy strategy) where 
significant sunk costs are likely to encourage further escalation. 
Figure 9 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
85 
 
Figure 9. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization— LCS Case 
2. Primary Research Findings: Amphibious Combat Vehicle (GAO, 
2018b) 
a. Case Overview 
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program’s purpose is to “acquire an 
enhanced capability to transport Marines from ship-to-shore under hostile conditions … 
[and] “replace all or part of the current Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) fleet” (GAO, 
2018b, p. 1). At the time of the report’s writing, the Marine Corps was nearing completion 
of system development and planned to initiate low-rate production for the ACV. 
Accordingly, GAO’s stated objective was to inform this decision was to “assesses the 
extent to which the Marine Corps is making progress toward (1) meeting cost and schedule 
goals for the ACV program and (2) demonstrating manufacturing readiness” (GAO, 2018b, 
Highlights Page). The ACV program was initiated in 2011 and served as a direct 
replacement for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. The EFV program 
was cancelled that same year due to affordability issues, costing approximately $3.7 billion 
over more than a decade in development (GAO, 2018b, p. 1). Summarizing the findings 
from their previous reports GAO found that the ACV program “made efforts to adopt best 
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practices and minimize acquisition risk, including: adopting an incremental approach to 
update capabilities, using proven technologies, increasing competition, and awarding 
fixed-price incentive contracts for much of the development work … [and] developed a 
high-quality reliable [life cycle] cost estimate” (GAO, 2018b, p. 7). The Marine Corps 
chose to develop the ACV incrementally, with each step (increment) upgrading the ACV’s 
capabilities. Overall, the program was in good shape and had already been commended by 
GAO for implementing several sound acquisition practices. GAO described the first ACV 
increment (ACV 1.1) as “on track to meet development cost goals with no additional 
anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones” (GAO, 2018b, Highlights Page). The 
ACV Increment 1.1 two-phased strategy began in 2014 and resulted in five contractors 
submitting proposals with two successful resultant contractors competing for the down-
select process in the second phase. GAO annually reviewed and reported to congressional 
defense committees the progress of the ACV 1.1 increment toward meeting cost and 
schedule goals and the program demonstrating manufacturing readiness. Specifically, 
GAO stated: 
[DOD] guidance for weapons acquisition production recommends that 
programs achieve [a manufacturing readiness level (MRL)] of 8 across all 
risk areas before entering low-rate production and that a program achieve 
an MRL of 9 at the start of full-rate production. GAO’s previous reviews 
about manufacturing best practices found that achieving manufacturing 
maturity and identifying production risks early in the acquisition cycle and 
assessing those risks prior to key decision points, such as the decision to 
enter production, reduces the likelihood of quality issues, cost growth and 
delays. (GAO, 2018b, Highlights Page) 
Accordingly, GAO recommended the Marine Corps “not enter the second year of 
low-rate production for ACV 1.1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall MRL of 
8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9” (GAO, 2018b, 
Highlights Page). DOD partially concurred with GAO’s recommendations, but contended 
that proceeding at a lower than recommended MRL could be achieved by taking steps to 
mitigate risk (GAO, 2018, pp. 19–20). 
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b. Findings 
Our analysis of the ACV case identified 28 discrete instances where a decision bias 
was evident. Table 5 includes a summary of the coded decision biases, which are ranked 
based on number of occurrences. Figure 10 depicts the percentage that each bias category 
was represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within the pie 
chart is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in Chapter 
III. 
Table 5. ACV Case—Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Control Con-3 4 
Overconfidence Con-5 4 
Success Con-8 4 
Attenuation Si-1 4 
Confirmation Con-2 2 
Desire Con-4 2 
Anchoring/Adjustment Adj-1 1 
Conservatism Adj-2 1 
Reference Adj-3 1 
Completeness Con-1 1 
Selectivity Con-7 1 
Misaligned Corp Goals Int-3 1 
Similarity Mem-5 1 
Framing Pres-1 1 
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Figure 10. Categories of Identified Decision Biases—ACV Case  
Figure 11 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed within the 
case study. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
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Figure 11. Assessed Decision Biases—ACV Case 
The following individual biases or groupings of biases are highlighted and 
discussed in greater detail because they appear prevalently in our analysis and/or provide 
a unique illustrative view from an HBP perspective: 
(1) Overconfidence (Con-5)  
The “Overconfidence” bias was assessed in 36% of the passages cited within the 
case study. The following is an example passage where we assessed this bias:  
The ACV program office and DOD also indicated that they anticipate 
production costs will be within goals established at the start of development, 
though key production costs have not yet been determined. (GAO, 2018b, 
p. 9) 
We assessed the “Overconfidence” bias for this passage because the DOD had 
confidence in achieving the ACV program’s production cost goals exists even though key 
production costs had not been established. This passage also indicates the DOD’s estimate 
was “unrealistically close to [the] best-case scenario” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 250), which is 
a situational indicator for the overconfidence bias.  
90 
(2) Success (CON-8)  
The “Success” bias was assessed in 36% of the passages cited within the case study. 
The following is an example passage where we assessed this bias:  
The ACV program office is in the process of conducting tests and 
assessments to determine if the program is on track to meet the criteria to 
enter production, but program officials told us the Navy … may choose to 
start low-rate production without meeting established best practices for 
manufacturing maturity. (GAO, 2018b, p. 10) 
We assessed the “Success” bias for this passage because this decision could have 
been based on confidence derived from the program’s generally positive acquisition 
outcomes to date. According to GAO, these positive outcomes were correlated with 
following established sound acquisition practices, but this decision would deviate from 
these norms. Decision-makers within the program may take these positive outcomes as a 
validation of their decision making skill rather than the result of following sound 
acquisition practices.  
(3) Control (Con-3) 
The “Control” bias was assessed in 36% of the passages cited within the case study. 
The following is an example passage where we assessed this bias:  
As we also previously reported, however, the Marine Corps received a 
waiver to forgo the establishment of a certified Earned Value Management 
System [EVMS] for the ACV program, which reduces the regularly-
available cost, schedule, and performance data available for the program to 
review. (GAO, 2018b, p. 9) 
Whether or not the waiver of the EVMS requirement was merited or not, reducing 
the Government’s visibility of cost, schedule, and performance metrics could induce the 
“Control” bias. Specifically, we assessed the “Control” bias because the reduced 
availability/visibility of key metrics may induce a false sense of control over these variables 
for program participants.  
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(4) Framing (Pres-1) 
The “Framing” bias was only assessed in the following passage, but is included 
here to highlight a unique decision bias: 
Previously, the Marine Corps sought to achieve enhanced capabilities in 
these areas through the [EFV] program, but due to concerns about the 
program’s affordability, after more than a decade in development and the 
expenditure of $3.7 billion, the program was cancelled in 2011. Following 
the cancellation of the EFV program, [DOD] authorized the Marine Corps 
to seek a new replacement for the AAVs, emphasizing the need for cost-
effectiveness, resulting in the start of the ACV acquisition in 2011. (GAO, 
2018b, p. 1) 
One can argue why the ACV program is distinct from the EFV program, but the 
fundamental intent for both programs was to replace all or part of the AAV fleet. By 
canceling the EFV program and starting the “new” ACV program, the DOD essentially 
wiped the slate clean of the “losses” associated with the EFV program. This is why we 
assessed the “Framing” bias for this passage. Changing the frame changed the perceived 
losses associated with acquiring the capability to replace the AAV fleet. This change in 
frame could have increased the influence of the “Overconfidence” and “Success” biases 
going forward.  
(5) Similarity (Mem-5) 
The “‘Similarity” bias was only assessed in the following passage, but is included 
here to highlight a unique decision bias: 
The Marine Corps considered the ACV to be a substantially non-
developmental item [NDI] because both contractors’ designs were based on 
vehicles that were already in production and deployed by other militaries. 
(GAO, 2018b, p. 4) 
We assessed the “‘Similarity” bias for this passage because, regardless of accuracy, 
the NDI classification could introduce the similarity bias by reducing the perceived 
likelihood of technical complications occurring based on the “degree of similarity with the 
class it is perceived to belong to” (Arnott, 2006, pp. 60–61) (i.e., vehicles which have 
already completed full-rate production). This can create overconfidence as seen further 
with production decisions. Carter et al. (2007) also defines the similarity bias as “The 
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likelihood of an event occurring may erroneously be judged by the probabilities of similar 
events” (p. 634). There are indications of this occurring in the case since the program 
justified eliminating the ACV’s second most important source selection criterion, 
manufacturing capability, citing the ACV’s NDI classification (GAO, 2018b, p. 12).  
Figure 12 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
 
Figure 12. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization—ACV Case 
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3. Primary Research Findings: Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier, CVN 78 
(GAO, 2017b) 
a. Case Background 
GAO’s report on the Navy’s Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier Program (herein referred 
to as the “program”) focused on the program as a whole, including the lead ship (CVN 78), 
the second ship (CVN 79), and two additional planned ships (CVN 80 & CVN 81). 
Considering the broad spectrum of issues addressed by GAO across the entire program 
within the report, we chose to focus our analysis exclusively on the GAO’s discussions 
relating to CVN 78. However, we did consider passages that drew direct correlations 
between the CVN 78 acquisition and the remaining ships. According to GAO, while the 
Navy’s intent for the program was to “improve combat capability while reducing 
acquisition and life-cycle costs … the lead ship [CVN 78] has experienced cost growth of 
nearly 23 percent, with a reduced capability expected at delivery” (2017b, Highlights 
Page). GAO pointed to “challenges with technology development, design, and 
construction, compounded by an optimistic budget estimate” (2017b, Highlights Page), as 
the primary factors leading to CVN 78’s cost growth. In the report, GAO describes these 
shortfalls in detail, and highlights the Navy’s continuing failure to apply these lessons 
learned, specifically related to cost estimating practices, to the remaining ships. GAO 
describes the Navy’s goals for the program as an ambitious undertaking due to the inclusion 
of several cutting-edge technologies and new design features that were intended to 
“improve combat capability, while simultaneously reducing acquisition and life-cycle 
costs” (2017b, p. 3). GAO attributed 40% of CVN 78’s cost growth and described 
numerous development challenges for the following critical technologies: Dual Band 
Radar (DBR), Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), and Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch 
System (EMALS).  
GAO compares the Navy’s cost estimating practices with GAO’s normative model 
for high-quality, reliable cost estimates, as established within GAO’s Cost Estimating and 
Assessment Guide. GAO’s normative model for cost estimating includes 20 best practices, 
which GAO (2017b) collapsed into the following four primary characteristics: 1) 
comprehensive, 2) accurate, 3) credible, and 4) well-documented (GAO, 2017b, p.6, 43–
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45). Organizations that contribute to shipbuilding program cost estimates include Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Group 
(05C), Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCAA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and program office cost 
analyst personnel. A series of checks and balances among these entities are intended to 
ensure valid and verifiable estimates are prepared and reviewed prior to milestone events. 
Program office personnel are further “responsible for developing and annually updating 
the Cost Analysis Requirements Description, which includes the program acquisition 
approach, system characteristics and preliminary schedules” (GAO, 2017b, pp. 6–7). 
However, GAO found program officials continued to recommend continued funding of 
additional ships (using unrealistic cost estimates), even though the DBR, AAG, and 
EMALS critical subsystems continued to experience development significant development 
challenges. The lack of adequate progress in the ship’s design and construction as well as 
the lack of successes in developmental testing of the above critical systems (and others) 
have significantly and negatively impacted the overall program cost, schedule, and proven 
capabilities of the weapon system.  
b. Findings 
Our analysis of the CVN 78 case identified 117 discrete instances where a decision 
bias was evident. Table 6 includes a summary of the coded decision biases, which are 
ranked based on number of occurrences. Figure 13 depicts the percentage that each bias 
category was represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within 
the pie chart is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in 
Chapter III. 
Table 6. CVN 78 Case—Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Attenuation* Si-1 15 
Overconfidence* Con-5 14 
Anchoring/Adjustment* Adj-1 12 
Hindsight* Mem-1 12 
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Bias Assigned Bias Code 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Conjunction* Stat-3 12 
Control* Con-3 10 
Escalation* Si-3 10 
Misaligned Corp Goals Int-3 5 
Strat Misrepresentation Int-4 5 
Complexity Si-2 4 
Conservatism Adj-2 3 
Desire Con-4 2 
Success Con-8 2 
Test Con-9 2 
Framing Pres-1 2 
Reference Adj-3 1 
Confirmation Con-2 1 
Selectivity Con-7 1 
Linear Pres-2 1 
Scale Pres-5 1 
Chance Stat-2 1 
Disjunction Stat-5 1 
*Bias included in list of concurrency related biases.  
 
Figure 13. Categories of Identified Decision Biases—CVN 78 Case  
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Figure 14 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed within the 
case study. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
 
Figure 14. Assessed Decision Biases—CVN 78 Case 
The following individual biases or groupings of biases are highlighted and 
discussed in greater detail because they appear prevalently in our analysis and/or provide 
a unique illustrative view from an HBP perspective: 
(1) Concurrency Related Biases 
There were several instances within this case study where GAO identified the 
Navy’s implementation of concurrency strategies as deviations from sound acquisition 
practices. GAO has long highlighted concurrency in acquisition programs as a concern. 
GAO (2012b) defines and discusses GAO’s position on concurrency as follows: 
Concurrency is broadly defined as overlap between technology 
development and product development or between product development 
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and production of a system. This overlap is intended to introduce systems 
rapidly, to fulfill an urgent need, to avoid technology obsolescence, and to 
maintain an efficient industrial development and production workforce. 
However, while some concurrency is understandable, committing to 
product development before requirements are understood and technologies 
mature as well as committing to production and fielding before 
development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in 
performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test 
problems. At the very least, a highly concurrent strategy forces decision 
makers to make key decisions without adequate information about the 
weapon’s demonstrated operational effectiveness, reliability, logistic 
supportability, and readiness for production. … In contrast, our work has 
found that successful programs that deliver promised capabilities for the 
estimated cost and schedule follow a systematic and disciplined knowledge-
based approach, in which high levels of product knowledge are 
demonstrated at critical points in development. (p. 7; see also GAO, 1990, 
p. 1–2) 
To increase the consistency and inter-rater reliability within our analysis, we took 
the additional step to predetermine a selection of assessed decision biases when assessing 
biases related to concurrency strategies. After screening the cited passages to ensure the 
same decisions/situations were not counted twice, we still found that 28% of the passages 
cited within the case were specifically related to concurrency strategies. Therefore, the 
inclusion or exclusion of biases from our predetermined list of concurrency biases had a 
significant impact on how prevalent these bias ultimately appeared in our analysis. In 
addition to thoroughly vetting our list of predetermined biases; we chose between biases 
with overlapping definitions, and identified additional biases as applicable, if certain 
criteria were met for a particular passage. Finally, our list of concurrency biases is 
applicable specifically to concurrency strategies that were implemented after-the-fact (i.e., 
not planned concurrency strategies). The following list of concurrency related biases also 
includes the percentage the bias was assessed within the entire case study, not just for the 
concurrency related passages: 
Anchoring and Adjustment (Adj-1): 41% 
Control (Con-3): 34% 
Overconfidence (Con-5): 48% 
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Attenuation (Si-3): 52% 
Escalation (Si-3): 34% 
Hindsight (Mem-1): 41% 
Conjunction (Stat-3): 41% 
The following is an example passage where we assessed these biases.  
Navy elected to proceed with production of some critical technologies prior 
to fully demonstrating their capability, in an effort to maintain the 
construction schedule. A strategy of concurrent test and production ensued, 
often leading to changes in components that had already been produced. 
(GAO, 2017b, p. 11) 
Instead of explaining why these biases were assessed for this particular passage, the 
following is a summary of our rationale for assessing these biases for concurrency passages 
in general. We included the “Anchoring and Adjustment” bias for concurrency since cost, 
performance, or schedule changes are situational indicators for this bias. Especially in 
situations where a program is seeking to catch up schedule delays, the “Anchoring and 
Adjustment” bias is likely to result in insufficient adjustments from an initial anchor 
(original schedule) when determining a realistic revised schedule. We included the 
“Control” bias since concurrency triggers several situational indicators for this bias. 
According to Arnott (1998), the “Control” bias can occur when “subjective probabilities 
of an event are systematically assessed to be higher than the relevant objective 
probabilities” (p. 9), and can be triggered by rigorous planning or even thinking about an 
event. We believe concurrency fits this description. Additionally, Langer (1975) found this 
bias was most prevalent in conditions where a chance task/environment is similar to a skill 
task/environment, and Koehler, Gibbs, and Hogarth (1994) found that decision makers are 
more susceptible to the control bias when they are faced with unique, low-frequency 
decision events. These situational indicators coincide with concurrency. We included the 
“Overconfidence” bias because concurrency strategies usually rely upon schedule plans/
estimates that “are unrealistically close to best-case scenarios … [and] could be improved 
by consulting the statistics of similar cases” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 250). Finally, 
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concurrency within a highly complex defense weapons program definitely fits the bias’ 
situational indicator of seeking “to solve difficult or novel problems” (Arnott, 2006, pp. 
60–61). We included the “Attenuation” bias because concurrency strategies often require 
“ignoring or significantly discounting the level of uncertainty” (Arnott, 2006, pp. 60–61). 
We included the “Escalation” bias because concurrency strategies almost always are a 
result of an escalation of commitment (i.e., catching up schedule). Two additional 
situational indicators of this bias are the existence of sunk costs (i.e., schedule delays) 
(Northcraft & Wolf, 1984), and when the original decision is announced publicly (Beeler 
& Hunton, 1997). We included the “Hindsight” bias because concurrency strategies are 
still implemented, even though there numerous examples of poor acquisition outcomes 
going back decades. Implementing a concurrency strategy may indicate a susceptibility to 
this bias by failing to learn from past events, thinking “This time, it’s different.” or “They 
didn’t have as good a plan as I have in place.” Finally, we included the “Conjunction” bias 
because concurrency is a compound event “where each element of the compound event 
contributes to the final outcome” (Arnott, 1998, p 8). According to Arnott, the 
“Conjunction” bias commonly occurs “when all elements must be completed on schedule 
for the final outcome to be on time [and] … excessive optimism … in estimating the total 
time required to complete a complex project” (1998, pp. 8–9).  
Concurrency strategies are not always bad decisions. For instance, if a required 
capability is desperately needed for the Nation’s defense, the DOD might pursue a 
concurrency strategy where significant cost overruns and/or duplicative capabilities are 
acceptable. However, GAO’s position is that concurrency strategies usually results in poor 
acquisition outcomes. If a concurrency strategy was not determined to be a good decision 
to begin with, then it is unlikely the existence of schedule delays would alter the original 
business case. Often, concurrency strategies end up compounding the schedule delays they 
were meant to mitigate. Fundamentally, concurrency often results in the program chasing 
after “sunk costs” (usually schedule delays) by taking additional schedule and/or cost risks. 
Concurrency was a common theme we encountered in our analysis, and many of the 
sources reviewed during our literature review indicated concurrency is a widespread 
practice among acquisition programs. Therefore, we speculate that further study and 
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interventions to mitigate the decision biases likely to encourage concurrency strategies are 
likely to yield significant positive results. 
(2) Strategic Misrepresentation (Int-4) 
The behavior we defined as “Strategic Misrepresentation” was assessed in 17% of 
the passages cited within the case study. The following is an example passage where we 
assessed this behavior:  
In 2014, we reported that the extent to which CVN 78 would be delivered 
on time and within the Navy’s $12.9 billion estimate was dependent on the 
Navy’s plan to defer work and costs to the postdelivery period. We found 
that CVN 78 would deploy without demonstrating full operational 
capabilities because it could not achieve certain key requirements—such as 
increasing launch and recovery rates—according to its test schedule. We 
also found that the Navy was implementing steps to achieve the 
congressional cost cap for CVN 79, but that they were largely based on 
ambitious efficiency gains and reducing a significant amount of 
construction, installation, and testing—work traditionally completed prior 
to ship delivery. … However, we suggested that Congress consider revising 
the cost cap legislation to ensure that all work included in the initial ship 
cost estimate that is deferred to postdelivery is counted against the cost cap; 
if warranted, we noted, the Navy could seek statutory authority to increase 
the cap. (GAO, 2017b, p. 5) 
We assessed the “Strategic Misrepresentation” for this passage because we 
interpreted the Navy’s decision to “defer work and costs to the postdelivery period” (p. 5) 
as a “planned, systematic distortion or misstatement of fact” (Jones & Euske, 1991, p. 437) 
in order to stay below the cost cap and reduce the perception of further cost growth for the 
program. According to GAO, Congress created procurement cost caps for the program to 
“help ensure that the Navy adhered to its cost estimates” (p. 1). Even after considering the 
Navy’s comments regarding GAO’s conclusions, we interpreted these decisions to be at 
least partly incentive-driven and supportive of GAO’s incentives narrative. While we were 
able to assess other decision biases for this passage, including “Misaligned Perception of 
Corporate Goals,” we determined that our Decision Bias Dictionary (DBD) did not have a 
decision bias that fully captured these incentive-driven behaviors. Accordingly, we added 
“Strategic Misrepresentation” to our DBD even though it technically is a conscious 
decision rather than a cognitive or motivational bias. However, as detailed in Chapter II, 
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for simplicity, we chose to classify “Strategic Misrepresentation” as a motivational bias 
since it is still relevant to our research and these behaviors coincide with GAO’s incentives 
narrative. Ignoring these behaviors just because they are not technically considered 
decision biases would not give GAO’s incentives narrative proper consideration in our 
analysis. 
Figure 15 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
 
Figure 15. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization—CVN 78 Case  
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4. Primary Research Findings: Tactical Aircraft, F-22A Modernization 
Program (GAO, 2012a) 
a. Case Background 
The Air Force’s modernization program for the F-22A program is continually 
expanding. As threats change, requirements and missions change, so too must this program 
adapt to a robust set of ever-changing threats through the addition of new capabilities. 
Spiral developments were replaced with increments in the early phases of the program. 
Modernization efforts associated with increments 2, 3.1 and 3.2A were developed and 
tested in concert with the production phase of this program and costs associated with those 
increments were included in the programs baseline. These events happened long before the 
recognition of increment 3.2B as a separate MDAP. Those increments were included as 
delivery orders under the umbrella of a 10-year, $6 billion IDIQ contract that was awarded 
in 2003. The ceiling on that contract was later increased as mission changes and further 
capabilities were added and developed. After expiration of the current IDIQ ordering 
period, a subsequent IDIQ contract was awarded for the programs continued modernization 
efforts. “Rather than making the new business case to justify and manage the 
modernization program as a separate major defense acquisition, Air Force officials 
incorporated it within the existing F-22A acquisition program and comingled funds” 
(GAO, 2012a, p. 11). Some of the earlier projects and increments were not recognized as 
separate MDAPS, even though the costs associated with these efforts were significant.  
b. Findings 
Our analysis of the F22A case identified 28 discrete instances where a decision bias 
was evident. Table 7 includes a summary of the coded decision biases, which are ranked 
based on number of occurrences. Figure 16 depicts the percentage that each bias category 
was represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within the pie 
chart is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in Chapter 
III. 
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Table 7. F22A Case—Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Attenuation Si-1 5 
Complexity Si-2 3 
Conjunction Stat-3 3 
Anchoring/Adjustment Adj-1 2 
Overconfidence Con-5 2 
Selectivity Con-7 2 
Correlation Stat-4 2 
Conservatism Adj-2 1 
Control Con-3 1 
Desire Con-4 1 
Test Con-9 1 
Misaligned Corp Goals Int-3 1 
Hindsight  Mem-1 1 
Scale Pres-5 1 
Habit Si-4 1 
Disjunction Stat-5 1 
 
Figure 16. Categories of Identified Decision Biases—F22A Case  
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Figure 17 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed within the 
case study. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
 
Figure 17. Assessed Decision Biases—F22A Case 
The following individual biases are highlighted and discussed in greater detail 
because they provide a unique illustrative view from an HBP perspective: 
(1) Scale (Pres-5) 
The “Scale” bias was only assessed in the following passages, but is included here 
to highlight a unique decision bias: 
Visibility and oversight of the program’s cost and schedule is hampered by 
a management structure that does not track and account for the full cost of 
specific capability increments. Substantial infrastructure costs for labs, 
testing, management, and other activities directly support modernization but 
are not charged to its projects. … 
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GAO recommends that DOD evaluate capabilities to determine if future F-
22A modernization efforts meeting DOD policy and statutory requirements 
should be established as separate major acquisition programs. (GAO, 
2012a, Highlights Page) 
According to Arnott (2006), “The perceived variability of data can be affected by 
the scale of the data” (pp. 60–61). For instance, a $100,000 cost overrun on a $1M 
acquisition can be perceived as significantly more of a concern than a $100,000 cost 
overrun on a $100M acquisition. In fact, we speculate that the “Scale” bias is likely to have 
a significant level of influence across all DOD MDAPs do to the inherently massive scale 
of these programs. However, in this particular case, increasing the scale of the acquisition 
was unnecessary, and according to GAO, was a poor decision. Accordingly, we assessed 
the “Scale” bias for this passage because the failure to track each increment as a separate 
MDAP unnecessarily increased the scale with which cost data was perceived by the 
program as a whole. This bias was assessed for the CVN 78 case for a similar reason.  
(2) Test (Con-9) 
The “Test” bias was only assessed in the following passage, but is included here to 
highlight a unique decision bias: 
Air Force officials stated that potential new capabilities are analyzed and 
vetted by evaluating technical maturity and applying cost as independent 
variable principles to determine which to include in the F-22A 
modernization program. … Tracking and accounting for the full and 
accurate cost of each modernization increment, and individual projects 
within each increment, are limited by the way the modernization program 
is structured, funded, and executed. (GAO, 2012a, p. 9) 
We assessed the “Test” bias for this passage because the modernization program’s 
tracking and accounting structure negates the ability to test/validate the cost information 
used to partly justify the inclusion of a potential new capability. GAO defines the “cost as 
an independent variable” principle as the “establishment of cost goals for operations, 
sustainment, and procurement, and for acquisition programs to make trade-offs in terms of 
cost, schedule, and performance” (2012a, p. 9). However, due to the program’s funding 
structure, the Air Force is unlikely to be able to test whether the capability’s cost goals, 
which were derived from their “cost as an independent variable” calculations, were 
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accurate. According to Arnott (2006), unrealistic confidence often arises in decisions where 
the “outcomes of choice cannot be tested” (pp. 60–61).  
Figure 18 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
 
Figure 18. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization—F22A Case 
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5. Primary Research Findings: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (GAO, 2009) 
a. Case Background 
The next-generation Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (a.k.a. F-35) Program was described 
by GAO (2009) as the DOD’s “most complex and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking 
to simultaneously produce and field three different versions of the aircraft for the Air Force, 
Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners” (Highlights Page). Our analysis 
reviewed GAO’s findings using the HBP perspective, but we did not attempt to incorporate 
later developments for the program in our analysis. Rather, our analysis is a snapshot of 
the JSF program at the time the report was written. The JSF’s planned capabilities included 
being able to transition between engaging targets in the air and/or on the ground while still 
airborne, stealth technologies, “defensive avionics, advanced onboard and offboard sensor 
fusion, internal and external weapons, and advanced prognostic maintenance capability” 
(p. 4). In addition, the JSF design consisted of three major variants, each customized for 
the needs of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. At the time of the report’s writing, 
the JSF program planned to acquire 2,456 aircraft at an estimated cost of over $1T ($300B 
for initial acquisition, and $760B in life cycle costs), spanning almost four decades. 
Needless to say, the JSF program is incredibly complex, and is critical to ongoing and 
future U.S. air superiority. GAO’s purpose was to (1) [determine] the program’s progress 
in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) [assess] manufacturing results and 
schedule risks; and (3) [evaluate] development test plans, progress, and risks” (2009, 
Highlights Page). GAO found the program will “cost more and take longer than reported 
to the Congress [in the previous year]” (Highlights Page) In spite of this, DOD wanted to 
accelerate 169 planned JSF procurements, and intended to procure hundreds of aircraft 
using cost-reimbursement versus fixed price contracts. GAO also expressed concern with 
DOD’s plan to reduce planned test aircraft and real world flight tests by relying on “state-
of-the-art simulation labs, a flying test bed, and desk studies to verify nearly 83% of JSF 
capabilities” (Highlights Page) GAO cautioned against “significant overlap [i.e., 
concurrency] of development, test, and procurement results” (Highlights Page), with 360 
aircraft planned to be procured prior to completion of development flight testing.  
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b. Findings
Our analysis of the JSF case identified 120 discrete instances where a decision bias 
was evident. Table 8 includes a summary of the coded decision biases, which are ranked 
based on number of occurrences. Figure 19 depicts the percentage that each bias category 
was represented for all of the assessed decision biases. Each bias category within the pie 
chart is the same color as the corresponding category within our DBD, detailed in Chapter 
III. 
Table 8. JSF Case—Identified Decision Biases 
Bias Assigned Bias Code 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Attenuation Si-1 19 
Overconfidence Con-5 14 
Hindsight Mem-1 11 
Control Con-3 9 
Anchoring/Adjustment Adj-1 8 
Conservatism Adj-2 8 
Conjunction Stat-3 7 
Reference Adj-3 6 
Misaligned Corp Goals Int-3 6 
Desire Con-4 5 
Selectivity Con-7 5 
Completeness Con-1 4 
Complexity Si-2 4 
Escalation Si-3 3 
Disjunction Stat-5 3 
Imaginability Mem-2 2 
Test Con-9 1 
Inappropriate Attachments Int-2 1 
Strat Misrepresentation Int-4 1 
Framing Pres-1 1 
Inconsistency Si-5 1 
Base rate Stat-1 1 
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Figure 19. Categories of Identified Decision Biases—JSF Case 
Figure 20 depicts the percentage that each individual bias was assessed within the 
case study. The pie chart graphically represents the incidence of every decision bias 
assessed for the case study; and is labeled with the bias category abbreviation, bias name, 
and number of times assessed. 
Figure 20. Assessed Decision Biases—JSF Case 
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The following individual biases are highlighted and discussed in greater detail 
because they appear prevalently in our analysis and/or provide a unique illustrative view 
from an HBP perspective: 
(1) Conservatism (Adj-2) and Hindsight (Mem-1)
The “Conservatism” bias was assessed in 21% of the passages cited within the case 
study. The “Hindsight” bias was assessed in 28% of the passages cited within the case 
study. The following is an example of a passage where we assessed both of these biases: 
Development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 
billion and the schedule for completing system development extended from 
1 to 3 years, according to recent estimates—one by the JSF Program Office 
and one by a joint team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air 
Force, and Navy officials. Cost overruns on both the aircraft and engine 
contracts, delays in manufacturing test aircraft, and a need for a longer, 
more robust flight test program are the primary cost drivers. The joint 
team’s estimate is higher than the program office’s because it included costs 
for the alternate engine program directed by the Congress and used more 
conservative assumptions based on current and legacy aircraft experiences. 
Program officials contend that funding the program to the higher cost 
estimate is premature and believe processes are in place to substantially 
improve on the test experiences of past programs. (GAO, 2009, pp. 7–8) 
We assessed the “Conservatism” bias for this passage because the program failed 
to revise their cost estimates appropriately to account for significant new data (i.e., alternate 
engine program costs). GAO noted the alternate engine program was directed by Congress 
in order to “induce competition and to ensure that one engine’s failures would not ground 
all JSFs, thereby reducing operational risks in the future” (pp. 9–10). However, DOD chose 
to not include funding for the alternate engine program within their estimate (p. 10). The 
“Conservatism” bias is classified as an “Adjustment” bias, and is similar to the Anchoring 
and Adjustment’ bias in that both arise from the cognitive difficulty humans experience 
when attempting to adjust from an initial position. Our tentative analysis findings and 
literature review leads us to conclude both of these biases are likely have a widespread and 
significant influence within defense acquisition programs.  
We assessed the “Hindsight” bias for this passage because the program indicated 
an unwillingness to incorporate lessons learned from past events, ignoring the “more 
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conservative assumptions based on current and legacy aircraft experiences” (p. 8) used by 
the joint team. Regardless of the validity of the program’s more optimistic reliance on 
improved testing processes, the context of the situation is a situational indicator for the 
“Hindsight” bias. Essentially the program is contending that ‘This time, it’s different’, and 
discounting the applicability of lessons learned from past programs. In fact, it is likely these 
past programs also suffered from this same bias. Finally, while it is likely individual 
defense acquisition programs are influenced by the “Hindsight” bias, we also believe that 
GAO and defense acquisition reformers are just as susceptible to this bias when judging 
decisions made with the benefit of hindsight. As indicated in Chapter II, we believe this 
bias is an especially important cognitive bias for acquisition reformers to mitigate since 
acquisition reform efforts have failed to solve the same fundamental problems over the past 
60 years (Fox, 2009, p. 35).  
(2) Desire (Con-4)
The “Desire” bias was assessed in 13% of the passages cited within the case study. 
The following is an example passage where we assessed this bias: 
DOD will make significant investments—in both dollars and the number of 
aircraft procured—before completing JSF flight testing. DOD’s proposal to 
accelerate procurement further increases financial risks in a very 
challenging test environment. … DOD decisions to reduce development test 
aircraft and flight tests add to the risks, while any additional delays in 
manufacturing test aircraft will further compress the schedule. … The 
department has stated that the contractor’s state-of-the-art ground test labs 
and a flying test bed will mitigate risks in the flight regimen and their use 
will effectively substitute for flight testing. This approach is promising, but 
not yet proven. (GAO, 2009, p. 20) 
GAO noted the program planned to verify an unprecedented 83% of the JSF’s 
capabilities using “series of advanced and robust simulation labs … [a] flying test bed, and 
subject matter analysis” (p 24); and cautioned “the ability to substitute [these methods] for 
flight testing has not yet been demonstrated” (p.25). We assessed the “Desire” bias, among 
others, for this passage because the program’s confidence in this “unprecedented” testing 
strategy was likely significantly influenced by their desired outcomes (i.e., schedule 
acceleration). Olsen (1997) found that even experts making decisions within their area of 
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expertise are susceptible to the “Desire” bias. Therefore, the possible influence of this bias 
among the ranks of highly intelligent experts within the program is not at all unlikely. As 
detailed in Chapter II, while the “Desire” bias is generally categorized as a cognitive bias, 
we found no clear consensus among decision bias researchers regarding the influence of 
motivational factors for this bias. Similar to the “Overconfidence” bias, a greater 
understanding of how cognitive and motivational factors interact to create the “Desire” bias 
is central to achieving a synthesis between the HBP and GAO’s incentives narrative. 
Figure 21 provides a word cloud illustration that graphically depicts the variety and 
frequency of the assessed decision biases within the case study. The size and color of the 
assessed biases are depicted relative to the frequency they were assessed, with bigger/
darker words indicating a higher frequency of assessment. However, the placement of the 
words within the word cloud are random. 
Figure 21. Decision Bias Word Cloud Visualization—JSF Case 
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B. SECONDARY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Based upon our review of the fundamental assumptions, historical development, 
and empirical research/critical reviews supporting GAO’s incentives narrative, we cannot 
reasonably determine GAO’s incentives narrative to be well-founded or conclusive. It 
appears there has been little research into the true nature and impact of how incentive-
driven decision biases shape acquisition decisions.  
In our review of major acquisition reform and GAO studies’ findings concerning 
defense acquisition culture and incentives spanning the past 60 years, we found no 
empirical research supporting the incentives narrative, no critical reviews of the 
assumptions underlying the incentives narrative, and no attention given to alternative 
theories developed within the decision science literature during the same time period. It 
appears that major acquisition reform/GAO studies over the past 60 years have developed 
largely independent of advancements in behavioral decision theory during the same time 
period. We also found that GAO’s seminal 1992 study of 81 of their previous works on 
defense acquisition programs from 1976—1991 essentially established GAO’s incentives 
narrative. The 1992 GAO report’s conclusions were based on subjective judgement, 
“corporate knowledge” (p. 13), and unexamined assumptions. However, the 1992 report 
did not represent its narrative as the “singular correct view” (GAO, pp. 2–3). Despite the 
apparent lack of supporting evidence, the report’s conclusions have largely persisted within 
GAO’s successive reports’ narratives. Many of GAO’s subsequent reports that discuss 
defense acquisition culture and incentives paraphrased and/or borrowed verbatim large 
sections of the narratives of the 1992 report and/or from each other. Considering this, it 
appears that GAO’s incentives narrative has largely been unquestioningly accepted by 
GAO, Congress, and the defense acquisition community. This reliance has possibly 
resulted in acquisition reform efforts that have not adequately examined the underlying 
causes of decision biases within defense acquisition programs. 
In addition, many of GAO’s recommendations for addressing poor acquisition 
outcomes have focused on the need to remove negative incentives which—according to 
the incentives narrative—drive incentive-driven decision biases. In addition to an absence 
of research relating to additional or alternative causal influences for decision biases, there 
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appears to be little to no research within the defense acquisition community examining the 
nature and impact of incentive-driven decision biases. GAO’s recommendations regarding 
negative incentives have largely focused on eliminating negative incentives rather than 
mitigating the influence of incentive-driven decision biases on decision makers. Removing 
the negative incentives highlighted by GAO has proved an intractable problem since these 
incentives are often engrained into the structure and culture of the Defense Acquisition 
System (Fox, 2011). However, even if all of the negative incentives identified by GAO 
were somehow eliminated, this would not eliminate or mitigate the influence of cognitive 
biases that are at least partly responsible for deviations from sound acquisition practices. 
Therefore, acquisition reform efforts must address both categories of decision biases to 
improve acquisition outcomes.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed our findings and the results of our analysis for our primary 
and secondary research objectives. Next, Chapter V details our conclusions, and provides 
recommendations for further research. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter details the conclusions and recommendations based upon our research 
findings, and provides several suggestions for further research. 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our findings indicate that decisions within defense acquisition programs may be 
susceptible to a broad range of cognitive biases, which could influence deviations from 
sound acquisition practices. Our research did not seek to disprove the incentives narrative, 
nor did it seek to prove conclusively that cognitive biases significantly contribute to 
deviations from sound acquisition practices. We expected at the outset that the limited 
scope and focus of our research would raise more questions and lines of further inquiry 
than provide definitive recommendations or conclusions. However, our research findings 
did allow us to draw the following conclusions and/or recommendations.  
Based on our review of the rationale, underlying assumptions, and supporting 
evidence, we found GAO’s incentives narrative to be neither well-founded nor conclusive. 
We found no empirical research supporting the incentives narrative, no critical reviews of 
the assumptions underlying the incentives narrative, and no attention given to alternative 
theories developed within the decision science literature during the same time period. Also, 
we found the conclusions made within a 1992 GAO report, which essentially established 
GAO’s incentives narrative, to have largely persisted within GAO’s successive reports’ 
narratives (GAO, 1992). This is despite the 1992 report stating that its conclusions were 
based on subjective judgement and “corporate knowledge” (p. 13), and stating the report’s 
narrative was not presented as the “singular correct view” (GAO, 1992, pp. 2–3). Many of 
GAO’s subsequent reports/published testimonies that discuss defense acquisition culture 
and incentives paraphrased and/or borrowed verbatim large sections of the narratives from 
the 1992 report and/or from each other. In spite of the narrative’s intuitive appeal, failing 
to rigorously examine and validate an assumption so central to shaping GAO’s 
recommendations for defense acquisition reform is a significant oversight. Accordingly, 
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we recommend GAO critically review the key assumptions underlying the incentives 
narrative and determine whether these assumptions are objectively supported by data or 
empirical evidence. Absent such a critical review, we recommend ongoing and future 
defense acquisition reform efforts not rely upon the incentives narrative as a well-
established point of fact. 
Our findings indicate that it is possible, or even likely, that cognitive biases 
contribute to deviations from sound acquisition practices. While our research is limited in 
its ability to draw broad conclusions due to the sample size and limited scope of our 
analysis, our findings provide an illustrative view of an alternative narrative (i.e., heuristics 
and biases paradigm [HBP]) to explain widespread deviations from sound acquisition 
practices. This illustrative view was achieved by examining the selected case study 
transcripts through the lens of the HBP perspective rather than the rational choice model 
(RCM) perspective. This alternative narrative is bolstered by a robust body of knowledge, 
which is vast and expanding, supported by scientifically robust and repeatable 
experimental evidence, and is widely considered to be generalizable to a broad range of 
fields of study (Heuer, 1999; see also Arnott, 1998, p. 3). This conclusion is also affirmed 
by widespread application of HBP within numerous fields of study such as economics, 
psychology, medicine, law, finance, etc.; and its’ extensive application by the CIA for 
intelligence analysis (Heuer, 1999), and by the DOD for military strategy (Kahneman, 
2011; Hillemann et al., 2015; and UFMCS, 2016). GAO’s incentives narrative and the HBP 
alternative narrative are both plausible, and they both require further research and 
supporting evidence to be reconciled into a unified model of decision making. Instead of 
‘rounding up the usual suspects’ (i.e., acquisition culture and incentives) to explain poor 
acquisition outcomes, we urge GAO and defense acquisition reformers to consider 
additional/alternative causal narratives. Accordingly, we recommend defense acquisition 
reform efforts consider the HBP perspective when seeking root causes for deviations from 
sound acquisition practices.  
The following biases were most prevalent in our analysis and have situational 
indicators that are likely common across defense acquisition programs: 1) “Attenuation,” 
2) ‘Overconfidence’, and 3) “Hindsight.” 1) There were 51 discrete instances where the 
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“Attenuation” bias code was assigned, accounting for 14.7% of all of the biases identified 
during our analysis. The “Attenuation” bias is likely to impact a defense acquisition 
program when decisions are simplified by “ignoring or significantly discounting the level 
of uncertainty” (Arnott, 1998, p.5), or when a decision maker eliminates what he/she 
believes to be unimportant or unlikely variables in a decision (Stoker, 1996). According to 
Arnott (1998) “Attenuation” “enables a person to cope with a complex, information rich 
environment [but often results in] arbitrary and inconsistent processes that act to exclude 
information” (p. 5). This bias can be mitigated by implementing general debiasing 
techniques, such as a pre-mortem analysis (UFMCS, 2014; Klein, 2004). 2) There were 42 
discrete instances where the “Overconfidence” bias code was assigned, accounting for 
12.1% of all of the biases identified during our analysis. The “Overconfidence” bias is 
likely to be present in defense acquisition programs that exhibit cost, schedule, and 
performance estimates that are “unrealistically close to [the] best-case scenario” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 250); or when a decision maker seeks “positive rather than negative 
evidence” (Koriat et al., 1980, p. 116), or is presented with an abundance of data (Sage, 
1981). Additionally, decision makers that are at a disadvantage with regards to their 
knowledge, skill, or experience are likely to exhibit the “Overconfidence” bias when 
predicting acquisition outcomes (Dunning, 2005), especially when evaluating a novel 
acquisition approach or procuring cutting edge technology. There are compelling yet 
conflicting research findings relating to whether this bias is driven by cognitive or 
motivational factors. This bias can be mitigated by implementing general debiasing 
techniques, such as red teaming (Reference more detailed discussion in the following 
paragraph), where participants are encouraged to view the decision from an adversarial or 
outsider’s perspective. 3) There were 28 discrete instances where the “Hindsight” bias code 
was assigned, accounting for 8.1% of all of the biases identified during our analysis. The 
“Hindsight” bias is likely to be present in defense acquisition programs that exhibit a “this 
time, it’s different” mindset, failing to incorporate or discounting the applicability of 
lessons learned from past programs. It is also likely that GAO and defense acquisition 
reformers are just as susceptible to this bias when judging decisions made with the benefit 
of hindsight. This is critical for acquisition reformers to mitigate because “decision makers 
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who expect to have their decisions scrutinized with hindsight are driven to bureaucratic 
solutions—and to an extreme reluctance to take risks” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 204). This 
observation is likely to strongly resonate with defense acquisition participants. The 
“Hindsight” bias can be mitigated by using general debiasing techniques. Additionally, 
defense acquisition reformers should seek to mitigate this bias when evaluating acquisition 
programs by emphasizing the complexities and uncertain context in which the examined 
decisions were made. 
General debiasing and/or bias mitigation techniques and strategies are likely to 
yield positive results for a broad range of decision biases, regardless of whether the biases 
are cognitively and/or motivationally driven. Implementing general debiasing techniques 
would allow defense acquisition reform efforts to largely circumvent the formidable 
challenge of creating a synthesis between the HBP and GAO’s incentives narrative. This 
approach can be characterized as treating the symptoms of a disease when the disease itself 
has no known cure or the diagnosis itself is uncertain. There is a wide and robust variety 
of general debiasing techniques, strategies, and tools already extensively utilized by the 
U.S. military, intelligence community, homeland security, local police, and private 
industry. For instance, “red teaming” is a structured approach to eliminate or mitigate 
cognitive biases and organizational assumptions/biases; and enable independent divergent 
critical thinking to see situations, problems, and potential solutions using alternative/
adversarial perspectives (Sandoz, 2001a; Sandoz, 2001b; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016; 
Zenko, 2015; Defense Science Board, 2003; Defense Science Board, 2010; UFMCS, 
2016). Also, the U.S. Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies offers 
training, education, and practical applications/logical frameworks relating to “divergent 
processes, red teaming tools, and liberating structures, all aimed at decision support” 
(UFMCS, 2016, p. 1). Additionally, “liberating structures” are organizational rules, tools, 
and processes that enable people of different temperaments, personalities, status, and title 
to communicate and provide unbiased feedback equally without the fear of retribution 
(Torbert, 1991; Zenko, 2015; UFMCS, n.d.; LiberatingStructures.com, 2016). Liberating 
structures can include groupthink mitigation techniques, anonymous contribution methods, 
weighted anonymous feedback (UFMCS, 2014; Zenko, 2015). These tools have already 
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been created and implemented extensively. Accordingly, we recommend these techniques 
and strategies be incorporated into defense acquisition frameworks and processes. 
However, general debiasing techniques are not a cure-all for every decision bias. Some 
cognitive biases have a unique trigger, and thus, general debiasing techniques may have 
limited efficacy for these biases.  
Our research revealed there is not a widely accepted taxonomy or authoritative 
dictionary of decision biases (Rodman, 2015, p. 18), which is why we had to compile a 
customized decision bias dictionary (DBD) to conduct our analysis. To further defense 
acquisition reform research efforts in this area, we recommend DOD establish an 
authoritative and standardized set of definitions/terminology relating to decision biases, 
decision bias taxonomy, and DBD. This will eliminate redundant efforts, and will enable 
and inform further research by establishing a common schema and consistent research 
approach. Our customized DBD, which largely incorporates Arnott’s (1998, 2006) 
taxonomy, is a good starting point, especially considering a 2005 RAND study of modern 
decision science also largely incorporated Arnott’s taxonomy (Davis et al., p. 13). 
However, we do not characterize it as sufficiently authoritative or comprehensive for 
widespread adoption across defense acquisition research efforts. Accordingly, we 
recommend a review of existing decision bias taxonomies be undertaken to inform and 
establish a customized decision bias taxonomy that includes both motivational and 
cognitive decision biases. While this taxonomy should be intuitive, it is imperative the 
included biases be well-established by scientifically robust and repeatable experimental 
evidence to the greatest extent practicable. Also, we recommend this taxonomy be simple, 
logical, and independent of any specific decision-making theoretical model. Once this 
taxonomy is established, a DBD with an intuitive/practical classification system, clear 
description/definitions, defense acquisition-specific examples and situational indicators, 
and associated terms/cognates should be created and published for use by defense 
acquisition researchers and practitioners. However, knowledge of decision biases does 
little to mitigate the influence of these biases (Kahneman, 2011, p. 417). Defense 
acquisition reformers that embrace the HBP perspective should be cautious not to 
implement training and awareness exercises as a means to mitigating cognitive biases. 
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Rather, a better understanding of the influence of decision biases can create the opportunity 
for defense acquisition reformers to design decision support systems and implement 
mitigation strategies that reduce the influence of these biases. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In conjunction with our last conclusion/recommendation, we recommend further 
research into existing and/or novel decision bias taxonomies to inform and establish a 
standard customized decision bias taxonomy that includes both motivational and cognitive 
decision biases. We recommend these efforts leverage the broad and expanding knowledge 
base that exists across multiple fields of study. Also, since the study of decision biases, 
specifically cognitive biases, is growing so rapidly, we also recommend this taxonomy and 
any resulting DBD be updated regularly to incorporate new research and experimental 
findings. Because most research into decision biases has focused on cognitive rather than 
motivational biases (Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015), we recommend further research to 
better understand the influence that incentives/motivational factors exert over decision 
makers. This research should focus on creating robust and repeatable experimental 
evidence to identify and support the classification of motivational biases.  
Second, we recommend further research be conducted to identify which decision 
biases most commonly and/or significantly influence improper deviations from sound 
acquisition practices. We recommend this review be conducted partly by seeking to detect 
the existence of decision biases using case studies and/ or real-world reviews/interviews 
across a broad range of acquisition programs. We would recommend an approach similar 
to our own methodology, but on a much greater scale to achieve broadly generalizable 
results. Additionally, in order to measure and/or determine the relative influence or impact 
of specific decision biases, we recommend further research be devised to gather evidence 
under controlled laboratory conditions. As stated in Chapter I, the inherent complexity of 
decision biases renders making such observations very difficult in the field, and 
necessitates controlled empirical/experimental research (Klein, 2008; as cited in Rodman, 
2015). Finally, supplemental/focused research may be necessary to accurately assess the 
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existence/influence of certain decision biases that might be systematically 
underrepresented based on the method of study (i.e., the “Search” bias).  
Third, our literature review found a lack of consensus regarding whether certain 
decision biases such as the “Desire,” “Escalation,” ‘Overconfidence,” and “Success” are 
cognitive and/or motivational. Accordingly, further study is recommended to ascertain 
whether these and other decision biases are likely to be purely cognitive-driven, purely 
incentive-driven, or some mixture of the two. A synthesis and greater understanding of 
how cognitive and motivational factors interact to drive behavior is central to creating a 
synthesis between the HBP and GAO’s incentives narrative. Additionally, this area of 
research may be especially critical since some of these biases appeared very prevalently in 
our coded case studies. However, if such a synthesis of cognitive/motivational factors is 
not feasible, further study and application of general debiasing and/or bias mitigation 
techniques and strategies are likely to yield positive results, regardless of whether the 
biases are cognitively and/or motivationally driven.  
Fourth, further study is recommended regarding the efficacy of utilizing specific 
mitigation and/or debiasing techniques to mitigate the influence of specific cognitive biases 
in defense acquisitions. This recommendation would be partly informed by our second and 
third recommendations for further research regarding which decision biases are most 
prevalent, and whether the biases are purely cognitive-driven, purely incentive-driven, or 
some mix between the two. However, our research has found that some cognitive biases 
have a unique trigger, and thus, the debiasing technique would require a specific mitigation 
technique. For instance, “Presentation” biases such as “Framing,” “Linear,” “Mode,” 
“Order,” and “Scale” cognitive biases are related to how information is presented or 
displayed to a decision maker. Further study of these biases could inform a set of 
information presentation best practices and/or requirements to systematically eliminate 
and/or mitigate poor decisions based on how data is presented. Such research is likely to 
yield best practices and recommendations that could be relatively easy to implement for 
numerous unique cognitive biases. 
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